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Abstract
Difficult ethical issues arise for patients and professionals in medical genetics, and often relate to the patient’s family or their
social context. Tackling these issues requires sensitivity to nuances of communication and a commitment to clarity and consis-
tency. It also benefits from an awareness of different approaches to ethical theory. Many of the ethical problems encountered in
genetics relate to tensions between the wishes or interests of different people, sometimes even people who do not (yet) exist or
exist as embryos, either in an established pregnancy or in vitro. Concern for the long-term welfare of a child or young person, or
possible future children, or for other members of the family, may lead to tensions felt by the patient (client) in genetic counselling.
Differences in perspective may also arise between the patient and professional when the latter recommends disclosure of
information to relatives and the patient finds that too difficult, or when the professional considers the genetic testing of a child,
sought by parents, to be inappropriate. The expectations of a patient’s community may also lead to the differences in perspective
between patient and counsellor. Recent developments of genetic technology permit genome-wide investigations. These have
generated additional and more complex data that amplify and exacerbate some pre-existing ethical problems, including those
presented by incidental (additional sought and secondary) findings and the recognition of variants currently of uncertain signif-
icance, so that reports of genomic investigations may often be provisional rather than definitive. Experience is being gained with
these problems but substantial challenges are likely to persist in the long term.
Keywords Ethics . Genetic information . Consent . Disclosure . Non-directiveness . Predictive genetic testing . Prenatal
diagnosis . Disability . Screening . Incidental findings . Additional findings . Variants of uncertain significance
Introduction
This paper outlines the issues and the material discussed in a
module on “ethical issues in genetic counselling” that is a key
feature of the Cardiff University MSc course in Genetic
Counselling. It cannot be complete and exhaustive and focus-
es on genetic counselling practice in UK and Europe, but we
hope it may be of interest also to those who work elsewhere.
Reflecting on the past
Ethics is important in the practice of every area of medicine,
but this is nowhere more true than in attending to the genetic
aspects of disease. Why is this so?
In part, this arises from the history of genetics. Public dis-
cussion about the inheritance of disease and non-disease traits
in humans began in the nineteenth century England, led by the
polymath Francis Galton. From its beginning, it was associat-
ed with attempts to improve society through selective breed-
ing, as if mankind was another farmyard animal with some
strains worthy of encouragement and others not. The discov-
eries ofMendel in his investigation of plants had not then been
widely recognised and Galton approached inheritance pre-
dominantly from a population perspective rather than the more
focused clinical perspective of the individual. Galton’s ap-
proach led to attempts to improve the genetic health of the
population, which he termed ‘eugenics’. This population per-
spective was taken up by philanthropists and politicians and
led to the ideas of positive eugenics (encouraging some to
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breed) and negative eugenics (discouraging others). Such
ideas were seen as eminently respectable across Europe and
North America at the turn of the 19th into the twentieth cen-
tury. The forced sterilisation of those deemed unfit to repro-
duce followed from this logic in many countries, including
Sweden and USA. In Nazi Germany, this approach was de-
veloped further into a policy of killing those patients consid-
ered unfit to live. The medical profession and associated sci-
entists, especially anthropologists, often colluded with these
activities in a devastating Faustian pact.
These events occurred in societies that viewed populations
as both inherently distinct and of unequal value. Ideas about a
natural heirarchy of racial types coalesced with ideas about the
incipent degeneration of any population if the less worthy
types were not stopped from breeding to excess. The effort
to maintain the purity and quality of the race—racial hy-
giene—became especially closely entangled in Nazi ideology
with their parallel beliefs about racial superiority, leading to
the murder of much larger numbers of those deemed inferior
because of their assigned race. However, what is common to
the two activities is the assessment of the worth of an individ-
ual from a population perspective: what good to the nation or
the state is this individual with a malformation or a cognitive
impairment? Of what use is this man or woman from an ‘in-
ferior race’?
One use that could be made of inferior types in Nazi
Germany was a role in human experimentation: the name of
Mengele remains infamous to this day. Some of his medical
colleagues gained high repute from their pathological studies
conducted post mortem on their patients, whom they had se-
lected to be killed for this purpose (Müller-Hill 1988; Harper
1996).
Apartheid can be seen as another application of this ideol-
ogy, with the mixing of ‘races’ seen as a contamination that
would lead to a degeneration of the true stock. The language
of genetics could just as easily have promoted such mixing of
populations through citing the benefits of ‘hybrid vigour’ but
that perspective is not appealing to the eugenicists.
The central lesson for us from this experience must be that
any benefits to a population or nation from clinical genetic
services should arise only as a secondary consequence of the
primary benefits to patients and their families. Benefits to the
population should never be used as the principal goal of clin-
ical genetic services, which should always give priority to the
interests and wishes of the individuals involved. Similarly, any
experimentation or research involving humans must be con-
ducted with the consent of the research participants, who must
be fully aware of any potential risks.
Since the end of World War II, the medical profession has
largely accepted these lessons, drawn from reflection on the
abuse of patients under the Nazi regime, and they are applied
far beyond the scope of genetics. Thus, the requirement of
informed consent for research is a central principle of human
rights under the terms of the World Medical Association’s
Declaration of Helsinki in 1964 (updated most recently in
2017). We are reminded of the need for this when we consider
some of the flagrant counter examples, such as the Tuskegee
syphilis study, which abused research subjects for a decade
after ‘Helsinki’. Despite these grounds for caution, enthusiasts
for population screening programmes have sometimes strayed
close to the eugenic motivation of the Nazi race hygienists,
justifying their interventions by the reduced birth rate of chil-
dren born with malformation or cognitive impairment and/or
the financial savings to the state. Indeed, it is sometimes un-
clear whether the motivation of enthusiasts for antenatal
screening is the ‘health’ of the population, the promotion of
the informed choices of parents, concern about the financial
pressures on the state or (sometimes) their own personal fi-
nancial gain through their role in providing screening tests.
Conflicts of interest abound, and mixed motives may apply.
It is to be noted that according to the 2017 update of the
Declaration, the Physician explicitly pledges not to use her
medical knowledge to violate human rights and civil liberties,
even under threat.
While few western governments would now espouse an
explicitly eugenic approach to genetic population health, the
underlying motivation for some antenatal screening
programmes may be very ‘traditional’ in this respect, despite
a veneer of politically correct rhetoric. In a time of financial
austerity, and with fading confidence in the equitable, state-led
provision of health care, social care and special education for
those with physical and/or cognitive impairment, the choices
being made by families in antenatal screening are not made in
a vacuum. Their decisions may be their own, but they may be
tightly constrained by circumstance and will not always reflect
their own wishes and values.
Reason, emotion and experience
Another reason for those who work in clinical genetics to
consider the ethics of their profession is that this topic area
engages us all, both patients and professionals, in a very deep
and personal sense. We are engaged in our heads and in our
hearts, both rationally/cognitively and emotionally, and the
two do not always mesh well together. It is possible to make
a decision objectively, in a cognitively ‘detached’ fashion, and
then find that it conflicts with one’s feelings. A logical process
of reasoning may lead to a decision that one finds unaccept-
able or even repugnant. Our task is to help our patients under-
stand their position biologically but then make personal deci-
sions that they can live with in the long term. The decisions
must be theirs, but we can help them to consider the various
factors that may be relevant, including factors they had not
thought of. The potential for a gulf between a detached and
objective decision and one’s feelings will often arise in deci-
sions about the sharing of information within the family, about
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predictive genetic testing where there are no available treat-
ments, and about prenatal genetic testing where the only med-
ical intervention available would be a termination of
pregnancy.
The assessment of the value of our work is much more
complex and nuanced than in many other areas of medicine.
Whereas there may be simple and objective measures of out-
come for the success of an orthopaedic procedure or the treat-
ment of organ failure, our criteria for the success of a consul-
tation are set by the patient and, therefore, will vary from one
consultation to the next, even for the same condition. We have
to ask our patients what they want from a consultation and
then do our best to achieve it. It is so patient-led that measures
of outcome, that would be valid across consultations and con-
ditions and between patients, are difficult to develop. The
most satisfactory measure of outcome is one based on the
concept of patient empowerment (McAllister et al. 2011).
In practice, we have to ask each patient about their partic-
ular concerns and decide with them what we can do to support
them. The core activity of clinical genetics and genetic
counselling is therefore communication, most especially lis-
tening to our patients. However, we may then have to help our
patients reassess their situation and revise their decisions in
the light of an enhanced understanding of ‘the facts’ and also
of their social and family context. So, we need to listen, to
assess the biological facts as far as we are able, to provide the
relevant ‘medical’ information to the patient and family in
terms that can be digested and applied by them, and then help
them adjust to their situation, so that they make decisions that
are true to their nature while grounded in as accurate an un-
derstanding of the biological facts as possible.
Our support may involve helping a patient come to a deci-
sion in the light of both ‘the facts of the matter’ and of an
awareness of their own likely response to the situation, which
will combine cognitive, rational elements with sometimes
powerful emotions. The patient has to integrate the facts with
their feelings.
The term ‘non-directiveness’ is often used to convey the
ethos of the profession, but this can be misleading: it may
suggest that we merely provide information and then leave
decisions to the patient. If true, that would, as we discuss
further below, be a superficial approach to genetic counsel-
ling, akin to the abandonment of our patients when they most
need our support. We would propose an active and engaged
form of non-directiveness, in which it may be our role to
challenge our patients, asking them to consider important fac-
tors that they may have chosen to avoid. We will ask them to
consider a number of ‘what if….?’ scenarios, so that they do
not undertake a genetic test without considering the full range
of options in front of them (including a decision not to have
the test) and the full range of potential outcomes of testing
(including an unclear result or an important but unanticipated
finding, incidental to the reason for having the test).
A framework for ethics in the clinical genetics
consultation
The first element of ethics is to recognise a problem as
being ethical, i.e. that there is a question about what one
ought to do. This may appear to be obvious but there are
several ways in which the obvious can be obscured. First,
it may appear that the ethical aspect of a situation—what
ought to happen—applies to someone else, such as the
patient or a member of their family or perhaps society’s
arrangements for funding health care. While the political
context may on occasion be relevant to the problems aris-
ing within the clinic, especially if resources are limited,
and one may feel obligations as a citizen to address such
questions, this does not resolve the ethical issues that still
face us, day to day, in the meantime.
Secondly, problematic aspects of genetic consultations
may be framed as ethical (for the patient or for the pro-
fessional) but may also be open to framing in other ways,
perhaps as an issue of counselling practice or as a ques-
tion of the social consequences of a patient’s decision for
others in their family, rather than a question of profession-
al ethics. It may be possible to frame the same problem in
any or all of these ways.
Having recognised the ‘ought’ element in the setting,
especially as it applies to oneself (the professional), one
then needs a framework through which to approach it. We
need to consider who is involved and what their interests
are (or might be). This could entail considering the inter-
ests of an unborn child or of future people (not yet con-
ceived), whose interests could not be considered in a court
of law but who must be considered from the broader,
more inclusive perspective of ethics. Listing those in-
volved and their potential interests can be helpful in clar-
ifying what is at stake and for whom.
The third element of this framework is to consider potential
solutions, noting whose interests they take fully and fairly into
account. Then, the final element is to formulate a coherent
argument about which of these potential solutions to work
towards (i.e. making a decision about what to do).
This fourfold frameworkmay seem rather insubstantial, but
it is a helpful approach in addressing even the most complex
problems. It is not a theory in its own right, however, and it
will need to be supplemented by other insights drawn from
logic and moral philosophy. In describing the ethical aspects
of a problem and in formulating an argument, it is essential
that any underlying assumptions are explicit and that the steps
in the process of reasoning are clear and valid (Flew 1975;
Holm 2004): we will not go far into this here, but it is impor-
tant to consider the consistency of an argument as it comes to
be applied to similar but non-identical instances, and to ap-
proach any explicit discussion of ethics with patients with
great care (Kaldjian 2013) as such discussions could easily
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become manipulative. A broad notion of the other ‘interested
parties’ whose interests are to be considered must be used, so
that the opportunity costs of a course of action are included in
the assessment, along with wider issues of social justice. And
the steps that may be needed to resolve a difference of opinion
between individuals or groups—the procedures involved—
may need to be made explicit, as in Habermas’s discourse
ethics. Such an approach places emphasis on the value of
following a process or procedure impartially and with
consistency.
An appreciation of the major schools of moral philosophy
is very helpful (Blackburn 2001). Those who examine ques-
tions of ethics from a specific philosophical or theological
position may adopt different approaches to thinking through
these questions, so that some familiarity with important
schools of thought may be useful.
Consequentialism assesses a course of action by weighing
the outcomes it leads to, the best known consequentialist ap-
proach being utilitarianism. Deontology draws on rules, in-
cluding ethical principles, rights and obligations, to determine
the right course of action. Virtue-based ethics is grounded in
ideas of human nature and the ends that we should pursue,
individually and collectively within society. If we do not
maintain this broader awareness of ethical theory, it becomes
all too easy for medical ethics to reduce to the mechanical
application, as if by rote, of the well-known Four Principles
set out by Beauchamp and Childress (autonomy, beneficence,
non-maleficence and justice) (Beauchamp and Childress
2013).
In considering eugenics, as above, one could say that
Galton’s eugenics is utilitarian in its attempt to maximise the
overall welfare (or happiness) of society. Objections to eugen-
ics will often be Kantian, as Kant was famous for his categor-
ical imperative, one formulation of which specifies that a per-
son should never use other people as mere means to her own
chosen end(s).
What is needed to address the ethical issues is a full en-
gagement of the professional as a person on every level: the
rational and intellectual, indeed, but also the interpersonal
awareness needed to understand the perspectives of others
and to recognise the subtleties of meaning that may be
expressed obliquely in communication, and the creative imag-
ination to consider likely emotional responses in different sce-
narios and to generate a range of possible solutions. A good
place to start practising these skills can be the consideration of
‘a case’ from the perspective of those most closely involved
(e.g. Thiele 2010; Wilkinson 2010).
In the rest of this chapter, we turn to consider the major,
recurrent issues that arise in genetic counselling practice and,
more generally, in medicine as it deals with genetic disorders.
A fuller account of these areas is given by Parker (2012) and a
survey of the issues emerging as genomic technologies enter
clinical practice is given in Clarke (2014).
Family matters: secrecy, disclosure,
communication and testing
A recurrent question in genetic counselling practice is,
‘When—and how—should we help, encourage and perhaps
persuade patients to share their personal medical and genetic
information with relatives and those close to them?’ Important
medical information about one person may be relevant to their
family members for many reasons. If one person in a family is
found to be at risk of developing a cancer or a serious cardiac
problem, for example, then medical surveillance may be help-
ful to reduce morbidity and/or mortality in others as well as in
them. A relative may also want to know if they are at risk of
developing a late-onset neurodegenerative condition, such as
Huntington’s disease, or if their children may be at risk of a
serious disease or a genetic condition that can cause a disease,
a cognitive or sensory impairment or a malformation that has
already affected one or more members of the family.
Of course, such information, when it may be relevant to
family members and when this is explained to the patient, will
usually be passed to relatives. This is especially true if the
unaffected but at-risk relatives can take action to avoid at least
some of the likely problems. Theymay be able to have screen-
ing for malignancies of the breast or bowel, for example, or for
a disorder of cardiac muscle or rhythm, or they may watch for
a potentially silent complication such as hypertension at an
unusually early age, as in polycystic kidney disease or neuro-
fibromatosis type 1. Awareness of such problems can substan-
tially improve the person’s likely prognosis.
Passing information to relatives can be experienced as
more difficult if there are no interventions known to improve
the outlook for those who have inherited the condition; this
applies (at least for now) in families affected by Huntington
disease (HD) and other neurodegenerative disorders. Telling a
relative that they may be at risk of such a condition but that
there is no treatment, so that ‘nothing can be done about it’,
may be a thankless task, with the relatives possibly becoming
angry, frightened and resentful. The family informant may
therefore decide to wait ‘until the time is right’ before passing
on the unwelcome information. But there may never be a
‘right’ time. Family gatherings may provide an opportunity
for such discussions, but it may feel inappropriate to raise such
questions at a wedding, or a funeral, or at Christmas. The
disclosure of genetic information by an at-risk adult to their
partner, before marriage or reproduction, can also be a very
difficult decision (Keenan et al. 2013).
Conversely, when there is a helpful intervention, the moti-
vation to pass on information is stronger. Families are often
willing to let health services make contact directly with their
relatives when the medical benefit is clear, as in familial hy-
percholesterolaemia (Newson and Humphries 2005). On the
other hand, when such a condition is not seen as very strongly
inherited but rather as a routine question for anyone of
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managing their own cholesterol level, the drive to pass infor-
mation to relatives may be less (Weiner 2011).
There have been numerous studies, often conducted by
social scientists, of communication about difficult genetic in-
formation within families. Such studies can be referred to as
research in ‘empirical ethics’ as the findings help ethicists to
remain grounded in their discussions in the concrete and often
messy reality of everyday life. Important and helpful studies
of this type are presented by Forrest et al. (2003) and
Featherstone et al. (2006). They discuss the barriers that can
obstruct the passing of information, such as geographical dis-
tance, family estrangement, concern about the emotional read-
iness of a relative to be given unwelcome information and
concern about the possible emotional response of the individ-
ual, who may become distressed or angry. Professionals can
draw on this work to help their patients plan how best to
disclose information to relatives. These studies remind profes-
sionals of the difference between ‘giving’ information and
‘receiving’ it: one member of a family may consider that they
have passed on the information but the ‘recipient’ may never
have ‘received’ it. Important information should be given in a
very clear and explicit fashion, and it may be helpful for pro-
fessionals to back this up with written information such as
letters ‘To Whom It May Concern’ that can be passed by
patients to their relatives.
The studies of both Forrest and Featherstone explore the
dynamics of disclosure within families, showing how they are
shaped by many factors including gender roles, with women
often assuming the management of information within a fam-
ily, evenwhen the relevant inheritance relates to their partner’s
family (d’Agincourt-Canning 2001). It is difficult to address
these factors realistically without colluding with the (western)
stereotypes of the silent male and the busybody female.
However, what is crucial for the clinician is to make no as-
sumptions about how the particular individuals in a family
will be inclined to behave. The importance of an accurate
understanding of inheritance cannot be over-emphasised, es-
pecially when gender roles and the biological facts combine to
downplay the involvement of males, so that the family may
fail to appreciate that fathers can transmit a risk of breast
cancer to their daughters (Hallowell et al. 2006).
Even testing for carrier status in a family affected by an
autosomal recessive disorder may have personal repercussions
for family members, both the affected individual and the un-
affected but possibly carrier siblings. Testing for carrier status
puts at risk the sense of family unity that is triggered by the
disease in question. A choice to be tested may suggest disloy-
alty to the affected family member(s), as by implication it
suggests that the patient’s brother or sister would not want to
have a child like their affected sibling, while finding that one is
not a carrier may lead the healthy sibling to feel isolated from
the family, as no longer involved with the disease in the way
that the others are (Fanos and Johnson 1995a, b).
The feelings raised by carrier testing in the context of sex-
linked disorders and chromosome rearrangements may be
rather stronger for two reasons: that the ‘carrier’ may some-
times be affected, at least to some extent, and that the condi-
tion is transmitted to the child solely by them, although the
decision to have children will usually be a shared decision
with their partner. In terms of the weight or burden of being
a carrier, carrier status for these disorders may be seen as
intermediate between the situation in autosomal dominant
and autosomal recessive disorders.
Genetics health professionals usually handle difficult fam-
ily situations in practice by maintaining links with the patient
and attempting to persuade them to disclose the relevant in-
formation to their relatives. It is exceptional for professionals
to force disclosure of information about one person to another
against their wishes (Clarke et al. 2005). There are important
procedures to follow before a practitioner should implement
such a disclosure, differing between jurisdictions. In UK, the
General Medical Council has issued guidance on this. Recent
changes to the law in France have emphasised the role of the
family member in passing on information but this may then
leave an obligation on the professional to ensure that this has
happened.
A particular issue faced occasionally by health profes-
sionals is that of misattributed paternity that comes to light
through genetic testing. While the ‘abstract’ ethical arguments
weigh heavily in favour of disclosing this to the ‘social father’
as well as to the mother in a couple who have come for testing
(Lucassen and Parker 2001), in practice professionals usually
try to avoid precipitating confrontation and conflict within a
couple. One lesson from such experiences is to make clear in
advance to those involved when a genetic test is being
discussed that might reveal misattributed paternity. This issue
can also arise when the daughter of a man with a sex-linked
disorder requests confirmation of her obligate carrier status.
In addition to gender, ‘culture’may be seen as an important
factor in family communication within some communities. If
consanguinity is customary within a community, and if carrier
status for a genetic disorder may attract stigma and lead to
difficulty in arranging marriage for oneself or one’s kin, a
family may wish to conceal their genetic condition from ev-
eryone else, and especially from other members of the family
(Shaw and Hurst 2009).
Difficult situations can also arise in the reverse situation,
when a relative feels obliged to undergo genetic testing so as
to pass on the information obtained to others in the family,
even when s/he would prefer not to be tested. This can arise in
the context of familial breast cancer, for example, when testing
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in an affected individual might
allow the family’s mutation to be identified. This may be very
helpful for the at-risk relatives but the affected person, who
already has a cancer, may not wish to face the prospect of the
higher risk of a second breast cancer or of developing ovarian
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cancer (Hallowell et al. 2003; Foster et al. 2004). It may be
difficult to determine whether a competent patient is ‘taking
the interests of relatives into account’ in an appropriate way, as
an expression of relational autonomy, or whether they are
being subjected to ‘undue pressure’ by family members. The
elucidation of the ethical considerations in this genetics con-
text are interestingly different from the issues raised by family
members who seek to ‘persuade’ a patient to make specific
decisions about their own healthcare, when the interests of
family members may differ (Ho 2008). Relational autonomy
is of broad applicability to many genetic counselling contexts
because it is a perspective from which all our lives are seen as
socially embedded, and within which family relationships are
seen as foundational to the rest. A strong version of relational
autonomy also emphasises that our very ability to form human
relationships arises out of our social origins and the care we all
receive from infancy onwards (Scully 2008, pp. 160–163).
Other difficulties are faced by those patients in whom a
sequence variant of uncertain significance (a VUS) has been
found. How helpful will that be to relatives, even if their
involvement might clarify the interpretation of the variant?
(Vos et al. 2011).
In HD families, too, this sense of being pressed or even
coerced by family pressure to be tested can arise when a young
adult at 1 in 4 risk of the disease wishes to clarify their status
while their at-risk parent prefers not to do so. The young adult
may wish to make reproductive decisions in the light of their
risk status while their parent, closer to the likely age of onset,
may prefer to avoid confronting the possibility that they may
soon develop the condition. Testing the young adult may re-
veal that their (so far unaffected) parent carries the HD gene
expansion; it can be extremely difficult for such information to
be kept secret within a family.
In such situations, we would encourage family members to
meet to discuss the issues before any of the individuals are
tested. Attending a genetic consultation together can some-
times be helpful in clarifying what is to be gained or lost by
any particular course of action.
A thoughtful approach to weighing up the competing is-
sues around personal genetic information in these and other
contexts is set out in Inside Information (Human Genetics
Commission 2002).
Predictive genetic testing consent,
competence and (non)directiveness
As discussed above, a predictive genetic test may be helpful in
a clinical, medical sense because it allows optimal manage-
ment of a patient at risk of an inherited disorder. When there is
no medical intervention to recommend, however, the benefits
of testing may be less clear so that considerations of the likely
personal impact of test results on the individual and those
close to themmay be the key factor in whether to take the test.
There may be a strong tension between wanting to know (that
the result is favourable) and the fear of finding out (an
unfavourable result). In those who know they are at risk of
HD, fewer than 20% have a predictive test to see if they will
become affected as, for many, the desire to resolve the uncer-
tainty is outweighed by the wish to retain hope (that one will
not be affected) (Tassicker et al. 2009; Baig et al. 2016).
In contrast to predictive testing for HD and most other
neurodegenerative disorders, testing for many other condi-
tions, such as the familial cancers and some of the inherited
cardiac conditions, has the potential to confer some potential
medical benefit. Once that becomes true for HD, the counsel-
ling in such contexts will change its nature completely and
become much more like counselling for the BRCA genes or
Lynch syndrome. Problems can arise in relation to predictive
testing for cardiac- and cancer-related disorders when there is
a mismatch between, on the one hand, how the preventive or
therapeutic possibilities are presented by clinicians and under-
stood by families in advance of testing and how, on the other
hand, they are delivered by health services and experienced by
families afterwards.
Constraints of space prevent a full exploration of predictive
testing across the many different settings in which it occurs.
Here wewill focus on the context of testing for HD but wewill
mention just two other disorders where experience with pre-
dictive testing demonstrates the dificulties that can arise if the
testing is approached as a straightforward, medically ‘obvi-
ous’ procedure, a matter for purely ‘clinical’ judgement, with-
out attention to the counselling aspects of the decision. First,
in the setting of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM), parents
can arrange predictive genetic testing for their children and
then regret their decision as the subsequent impact upon their
children’s lives becomes apparent. Ethnographic studies that
track families over some years are difficult to resource but can
be very valuable (Geelen et al. 2011). In the very different
context of predictive genetic testing for the Li-Fraumeni syn-
drome, a scheme for tumour surveillance has been proposed
(Villani et al. 2011) but proof that it is of value at any age—
and especially in childhood—is lacking. What stance should
clinicians adopt towards predictive testing of young children?
There is no single, clear answer (see discussion in British
Society for Human Genetics 2010, page 21).
Returning to the non-therapeutic context of HD, perhaps
the main question for the clinician is how firmly to challenge
the patient’s request for testing. One does not want to be un-
helpful and obstructive to those who wish to be tested but it is
important to ensure that an irrevocable step is not taken before
it has been considered carefully and from multiple perspec-
tives. Predictive testing in the absence of any useful medical
intervention—‘for information only’—is therefore one of the
paradigmatic settings in which the ‘counselling’ aspects of
genetic counselling come to the fore, and we therefore devote
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a considerable portion of this article to testing in this context,
especially in relation to Huntington’s disease. HD was histor-
ically the first disorder for which predictive genetic testing
became widespread and much experience has been gained in
this setting. Testing for HD is also much commoner than for
the other autosomal dominant Mendelian neurodegenerative
disorders.
In this context of counselling for predictive testing without
clear medical benefit, there is a blurring of the distinctions
between factors to be considered by the professionals. There
are clinical factors, issues of counselling and communication,
and ethical considerations. These three categories merge and
become very difficult to keep distinct. In this section, there-
fore, we discuss the clinical process in some detail.
Here, we will consider three more focused questions:
(i) How to respond to those who request testing but are un-
willing to engage in the counselling?
(ii) How to respond to requests for testing made by adoles-
cents and young people (ages 16–24). Can it be
appropriately paternalistic to seek to delay the making
of decisions by at least some patients?
(iii) How can we challenge patients—gently, with consider-
ation and respect—to help them arrive at their decision
in a more integrated or authentic manner?
We wish to influence not the decisions made by our pa-
tients but the way in which they make their decisions, so that
we can all be more confident that taking the test—if that is
what they choose to do—will on balance be helpful, whatever
the result.
Talking about testing—with Huntington’s disease
as a model condition
Some individuals at risk of HD come to clinic convinced that
they should have testing at once, without any discussion, and
that they will be able to deal with whatever results emerge.
After all, it is their ‘right’.
When it is explained that there is no medical benefit from
testing and that we have a professional obligation to ensure
that they have given valid consent before being tested, then
most of these individuals agree to go through with the
counselling process as recommended by international guide-
lines (MacLeod et al. 2013). Even if they feel they are
humouring or tolerating us professionals, they will usually
be willing to oblige. If they are not willing to do this, we
sometimes fear that that their hold on calm consideration is
fragile and likely to dissolve. Taking short cuts because of
pressure to test rapidly is usually not helpful, although (very
occasionally) it may be appropriate. It may, for example, be
appropriate to accelerate the predictive testing process in a
pregnancy. Even then, however, caution is important. Our
experience leads us to believe that rushed testing in a preg-
nancy can have a grave and continuing impact on the individ-
uals involved, including the next generation.
While the best practice guidelines cited above draw on
evidence and experience, it is difficult to claim that they are
fully justified on the evidence. Indeed, it would be difficult to
know what evidence could be provided to confirm that a par-
ticular tradition of clinical practice was the optimum ap-
proach. Longitudinal studies could demonstrate that a certain
proportion of the patients were adequately satisfied (especially
those given a favourable result), but some patients would in-
evitably drop out from the study (especially those given an
unfavourable result). Furthermore, it would be difficult to
compare the outcomes of one clinical approach with those of
another, if they differed substantially, as many clinicians
would be unwilling to follow the full range of available poli-
cies. We, for instance, would not be willing to test those who
request a predictive test without any counselling: we feel a
responsibility to be as sure as we can be that everyone tested
understands the range of possible test results and has had a real
opportunity to reflect on the consequences, for them and
others, for each result. In addition, evidence on some points
could only be gathered by performing tests that we would
consider unethical, and then following up those involved for
several decades: as with the predictive testing of young chil-
dren for HD. This topic will be explored further in the
‘Genetic testing of (young) children’ section.
In what follows, therefore, we present a composite account
of our preferred clinical approach (even when it is supported
by our experience rather than a body of research evidence)
along with a discussion of some of the relevant research.
When a patient finds it emotionally difficult to engage
with the discussion, it can be very helpful to reassure
them that the decision is theirs and that we will carry
out the test if they persist in requesting it. This can help
overcome the sense that they must always present a
strong, competent face to us in case our suspicion of their
ambivalence or weakness means that we will deny them
the test. In fact, of course, we feel much readier to test
someone who can honestly discuss their ambivalence than
someone who cannot admit such feelings even to her- or
him-self, but an honest reassurance that we will really
give away control completely can remove an important
block that prevents some patients from engaging with
the counselling. This reassurance, of course, should not
be given if we in fact have reservations, as when we sense
the features of depression or another mental illness.
An imbalance of power is an inevitable part of a medical
consultation—if the professionals did not have greater knowl-
edge and skill, then there would be no point in people seeking
our services—but the imbalance can be destructive and, in
these circumstances, we should work to minimise it. At the
same time, we can acknowledge that the patient will be expert
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in their own situation and we need to work with them in
partnership to achieve the best outcome possible.
When a patient appears unable or reluctant to engage with
the counselling around genetic testing, the question may arise
as to their ability to give consent to testing. In addition to
having the information needed to make a decision and to not
being subject to coercion (either blatant coercion or more sub-
tle emotional manipulation), they should have the cognitive
capacity to consent. For the professionals to have confidence
that a patient has the capacity to consent under English law,
professionals may need to weigh up this question: ‘Does this
patient have a disturbance or impairment of the mind or brain
and, if so, can this patient understand and retain and weigh up
and communicate the information needed to make this deci-
sion?’ If the answer is ‘No’, then a decision about testing may
need to be taken after discussion at a ‘best interests’ meeting.
If there are real doubts about the patient’s capacity, or about
their best interests, then a process of assessment may be re-
quired, potentially involving the courts or a legally appointed
advocate.
When a competent patient argues that s/he should have
testing without any discussion, and cannot be persuaded that
the professionals have the responsibility to comply with stan-
dards of practice, an impasse may be reached. This is unusual
but does—infrequently—occur. In such circumstances, the
professional’s responsibility to provide good quality care
may take precedence over the patient’s wishes. This can be
framed as the professional over-riding the patient’s autonomy,
but is perfectly legitimate in its own terms (Lantos et al. 2011).
However, there is a separate discussion to be had about wheth-
er such a patient’s stated wishes do express their autonomous
decision. From a Kantian perspective, which sets a high stan-
dard as to what counts as autonomy, this could be contested if
the patient has failed to seek full information or has not given
due weight to relevant and important considerations.
Our clinical approach follows that recommended in the
consensus policy (MacLeod et al. 2013). We almost always
have at least two meetings with the at-risk patient, sometimes
more, with an interval of a month or so between each meeting.
A genetic counsellor usually has a preliminary meeting to
gather background information about the at-risk patient and
their family, to seek confirmation of the precise diagnosis in an
affected relative, to identify the wishes and expectations of the
patient and to explain to them how the clinic functions. In the
next consultation, we would usually discuss how they became
aware of their risk of HD and how long ago. If this is recent,
within the last year, that may be a reason to proceed more
slowly with the testing. We would wish to know what they
have learned about HD, through experience or in other ways,
and perhaps provide additional information about the variabil-
ity in age of onset and in the pattern of disease. Crucially, we
will ask what it is that has triggered the request for testing now
rather than last year or next year.
We would ask the patient how they feel they would cope
with an adverse result, although of course no-one can be sure
about this, and whether there is anything they or we could do
in advance to help prepare for a period of real distress. It may
be helpful to consider how they have coped with distress in the
past, whether they rely on alcohol or ‘street drugs’, and wheth-
er they have a history of psychiatric disease or psychotropic
medication. Such factors need not block access to testing but
do help them to reflect on their request and whether it may be
better to defer testing until they feel more resilient, their cir-
cumstances are more stable or they are better supported.
Other topics to discuss in advance of testing include who
knows about their risk of HD (in the family, among their
friends, their employer, etc.) and who knows that they are
coming to clinic to discuss testing. To whom would they pass
on news of their result? If they have children, are the children
aware of their own risk? If the children are adolescent or adult,
have they discussed the decision to be tested with them? If not,
we would usually encourage them to do so, especially if a
major reason for testing is so that they can tell their children.
If an at-risk adult defers any discussion with their at-risk chil-
dren (whether still minors or already adult) until their own risk
is known, there is a trade-off between difficult scenarios.
Either they must discuss the question of HD with their chil-
dren when the children are still at 1 in 4 risk (when some of
these difficult discussions will prove to have been unneces-
sary) or they must have a still more difficult discussion when
their own decision to have predictive testing may have placed
their children at 1 in 2 risk before they (the children) have any
knowledge of their potential risk. We would generally suggest
that the discussion is to be preferred earlier, as we have often
seen the latter approach lead to resentment in the children at
having been kept in the dark for too long. Breaking the family
secret about HD at that point—once the child has been put at 1
in 2 risk—may also prove too difficult for some parents, who
are still adjusting to their own positive result. This then leads
to further secrecy within the family and a greater potential for
emotionally destructive disclosures in the future.
This question of an at-risk parent discussing with their chil-
dren—or other important family members—their own deci-
sion in advance of the testing is one of the points about which
gentle challenging may be appropriate. Indeed, the impact of
the test on the family as a system is a useful focus for discus-
sion (Sobel and Cowan 2000). The question of ‘challenging’
about the impact on the family also arises in the context of
testing those at 1 in 4 prior risk of disease (Maat-Kievit et al.
1999).
Following these discussions, the testing would then usually
take place at a third appointment. This allows the patient some
further opportunity for reflection and also for other questions
to be raised, especially if the patient’s companion in the clin-
ic—often a partner or spouse—has less knowledge and expe-
rience of HD.
10 J Community Genet (2019) 10:3–33
An adverse result will often cause distress but may never-
theless be very helpful. However, how does the patient think
that the quality of her life will be altered by this knowledge,
between the test result and the onset of disease? Inmanyways,
this is the crucial question for someone at risk to consider. It
must be disentangled from the practical question of coping
with the disease once it has begun. In addition, and also very
practically, what might the implications of testing be for em-
ployment or career, for health and life insurance, and for driv-
ing? These topics are the aspects of HD most likely to trigger
institutional discrimination and this often arises as a topic of
discussion in the clinic (Erwin et al. 2010). Fortunately, in
many countries, those at risk of HD now have a degree of
legal protection, although that does not prevent stigmatisaton
at the level of personal behaviour and intimate relationships in
HD and other neurodegenerative disorders (Bombard et al.
2012; Mendes et al. 2017).
In the event of a favourable result, some patients whose
burden of risk is lifted from themmay nevertheless experience
some very negative feelings (Huggins et al. 1992). They may
feel excluded from their family, as no longer sharing in this
key aspect of family life, and may find it hard to communicate
with those siblings still at risk. Others may regret decisions
they have made in the past (concerning marriage, career, re-
production). Such possible consequences of a ‘good’ result
may be unanticipated by many if they are not raised in the
discussion before testing.
Explaining the limitations of testing is also most important:
the possibility of a grey zone result; the possibility of a mis-
leading result if molecular confirmation of the diagnosis in the
family has not been achieved because no sample of DNA is
available from an affected family member; and the impossi-
bility of predicting with any accuracy when or how the con-
dition might begin to manifest. This can lead into a discussion
of the unexpected outcomes of testing outlined above, espe-
cially the often unanticipated negative impact of a favourable
result.
Having gestured towards the complexity of factors to be
considered in coming to a decision about testing, we can now
return to the patient who is reluctant to engage in the discus-
sion. Some who want the test without the talk have clearly
brittle defences, so that it would be irresponsible to test them at
first meeting. Others, however, find it difficult to consider the
hypothetical scenarios (‘How would you feel if ….?’) that
comprise the core of pre-test counselling (Sarangi et al.
2005). This may be expressed as, ‘I’ll deal with it when it
happens’. This may be a question of personality, of coping
style, of psychological defence, of cognitive limitation, or of
a failure of the professional and patient jointly to establish a
connection—a bond of trust. Whatever the reason, the failure
to engage can obstruct the counselling. This, on its own, is not
a reason for refusing to perform the test, however, but an
indication to the professional that an adverse result in such a
patient may lead to greater distress as there has been less
opportunity for them to rehearse and prepare for an adverse
outcome.
While a reluctance to engage with the genetic counselling
process will often need to be discussed and to become a topic
within the consultation, there may be other, practical barriers
that should be considered carefully, especially if they could
result in social or geograhical inequity of access to genetic
sevices for HD (as for other disorders). Thus, in countries with
sparse and dispersed populations, geography may be a major
barrier to accessing such services (Hawkins et al. 2013).
Creative solutions may then be very appropriate, such as out-
reach clinics or tele-consultations, as long as the quality of
service provided does not suffer. Simply providing the predic-
tive test without the usual high (we would hope) standard of
counselling and support would not be professionally
acceptable.
Patients who are ‘young’
As experience of predictive genetic testing for HD and other
disorders ‘without treatment’ has accumulated over two de-
cades, there has been a greater professional willingness to
consider requests for testing from young people. While the
international guidelines have suggested deferring a request
for testing until at least 18 years but providing information,
counselling and support to those younger than 18 years
(MacLeod et al. 2013), others point out that there is no evi-
dence of harm from testing children or young people (Michie
1996) and advocate for making predictive testing available to
those younger than 18 (Duncan et al. 2008; Mand et al. 2013).
However, the absence of evidence of harm is far from being
evidence of the absence of harm. Consideration about the
nature of the evidence that would be required to establish that
harm had occurred is required; it may be impractical to gather
such evidence, especially if the timescale involved might ex-
tend to decades.
Any age cut-off for predictive testing will be arbitrary, and
this could indeed be counter-productive if those who cross the
age limit then assume that they can have a test on request and
without discussion. An age cut-off, however, may serve a
useful function of protecting some very vulnerable individ-
uals. Researchers who are enthusiasts for testing younger in-
dividuals sometimes report their research findings on those
tested for a variety of disorders without distinguishing care-
fully between the conditions. Disorders with very different
implications may be reported together, where some do and
others do not have useful medical interventions. Down-
playing these differences is unhelpful, and so is the lack of
emphasis on the bias, among those tested for HD, who are
willing to participate in follow-up research interviews towards
those who test negative (a bias not so apparent for other dis-
orders, where testing is clinically indicated). Clearly
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distinguishing tests for HD from those where the test is clin-
ically recommended is crucial as the context of the decision to
test is so different. There is a more general discussion about
the genetic testing of children, and several of the international
policy guidelines, in the ‘Genetic testing of (young) children’
section.
For the practitioner, there are competing tensions. We do
not want to deny young people the potential benefits of test-
ing, whether the test result is negative or positive, but nor do
we want a young person to make a decision that they may
soon regret. While at least some young people at risk of HD
have an excellent understanding of the condition in context,
others have been impacted by difficult family circumstances
and their ability to make a good decision or their family’s
ability to provide support afterwards may be impaired.
Professionals will be concerned that factors such as denial,
an adolescent sense of invulnerability linked to risk taking,
an impulse to rebellion and a desire to separate from their
family may all lead to the hasty making of decisions, if the
young person has a limited ability to imagine the full range of
possible test outcomes and how they may play out in their
lives.
Some young people simply ‘wish to know’ without there
being a specific decision that depends upon the result. We
would suggest caution in such circumstances as the wish to
know might apply only to the wish to have a good result. It
may be difficult for any 18 year old to imagine their life at
30 years. How will decisions about relationships, courtship
and reproduction work out in the light of different test results,
as compared with a decision not to be tested (for the moment)?
When and how will they raise the question of HD for discus-
sion with a (potential) partner?Will it be easier to do that in the
knowledge of their test result, or will that make it more diffi-
cult? On the other hand, they may be able to adapt well to their
long-term prognosis at this age, as it may seem remote. Further
research in this area, involving patient support groups and the
accumulation of longitudinal case series, will be important.
Very helpful research into the experiences of young people
at risk of HD draws attention both to the potential benefits of
testing and the challenging circumstances faced by some
young people (Forrest Keenan et al. 2015). Testing can be
empowering and support the development of the young per-
son’s identity. Factors that can complicate discussions with
young people about testing for HD include the lack of family
support that many experience, often indeed their sense of iso-
lation. The response to test results can be especially difficult if
the young person has only recently become aware of their risk
or if the result differs from what they had expected. The im-
pact of testing on subsequent family relationships may also
throw up unanticipated difficulties.
In striving to develop a constructive approach to predictive
testing in young people, it is very helpful to draw upon frame-
works for understanding the normal processes of personality
development. McConkie-Rosell and Spiridigliozzi (2004) set
out a helpful framework while Richards (2006) examines the
needs of adolescents in relation to genetic testing. Binedell et
al. (1996) set out an approach to assessing the ‘maturity’ of
adolescents seeking testing for HD. Some very helpful reports
of testing young people for HD and other disorders have
appeared, giving constructive suggestions as to how the
genetic counselling process may provide improved support
for this group. Thus Gaff et al. (2006) reflect upon their expe-
rience of genetic testing for familial bowel cancer in adoles-
cents, while MacLeod et al. (2014) report the accounts and
suggestions of young people after the process of testing for
several different disorders (including HD) had been completed.
There are good grounds for taking the patient’s age into ac-
count, through being especially open to flexibility with adoles-
cents, but also being concerned to ensure that a request for
testing is based on a considered and sustained wish, that the
patient has been helped to think through the potential implica-
tions for relationships within the family, that the support avail-
able to the patient has been addressed carefully, and that the
testing is not being sought as an act of defiance or self-assertion
or as an automatic rite of passage for the 18th birthday.
Active non-directiveness
Returning to ‘non-directiveness’, it is necessary to distinguish
the professional-patient relationship from a commercial trans-
action with a customer. If ‘non-directiveness’ simply meant
doing what the customer requested, then, in our opinion, that
would be an unacceptably shallow conception and a failure to
fulfil our role. Simply following the patient’s instructions
could amount to the professional acting on the basis of a
patient’s whim or their ill-considered initial impulse in a dif-
ficult personal situation, which would be an abandonment by
the professional of not only that particular patient but also their
professional responsibilities. Rather than this, a practitioner
has to provide the relevant information in an accessible way
and raise factors for consideration that the patient may have
not yet considered, as set out above.
Non-directiveness, rather contrary to its label, aspires to be
an active process rather than a passive state. It can be difficult
and challenging for the professional as well as for the patient;
it demands full engagement with both the facts and
interactionally with the patient in the consultation. There are
many decisions about genetic testing that are much more rou-
tine because there is a clear medical recommendation to make,
as in testing for certain susceptibilities to malignancy (Elwyn
et al. 2000). It is still good practice to discuss the emotions that
may be faced in those different circumstances but the intent in
raising such issues is not to challenge a patient’s decision
whether to be tested but to help improve their preparation
for facing the test results. In contrast, in the context of HD,
one is wanting to engage the patient much more in thinking//
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feeling her way through the decision and, potentially, to
change her mind. We would want to help her to imagine her
potential responses to the different outcome scenarios, so that
she can effectively self-select as to whether she feels strong
enough to go ahead with testing or not (yet).
In essence, active non-directiveness recognises that profes-
sionals will influence their patients, and that a process of in-
fluence is actually desirable. One can then work with this
positively rather than simply denying or attempting to mini-
mise any influence, as a shallow non-directiveness would do.
Training for the genetic counsellor will aim to develop insight
about the influence that is exerted and how to make this influ-
ence appropriate and helpful, to enhance the decision making
process of the patient (Kessler 1992; Wolff and Jung 1995;
Clarke 1997). This approach can be framed in the language of
counselling or psychotherapy, or it can be viewed as grounded
within a philosophical tradition. John Stuart Mill’s sense of
autonomy incorporates questioning and challenging that pro-
motes the other person’s autonomy (discussed in Lantos et al.
2011), but it can also very readily be considered from within a
Kantian perspective or from within virtue ethics.
In the next section, we will move from predictive genetic
testing to the question of pregnancy and prenatal diagnostic
testing. There is a strong continuity between these two sec-
tions as the prenatal context is the other setting within clinical
genetics in which the question of non-directiveness has par-
ticular salience and force.
Prenatal diagnosis, prenatal screening
and disability
The use of genetic testing in various forms of prenatal diag-
nosis raises many ethical issues. These include questions
about whether, and under what circumstances, it can be ac-
ceptable or even the best course of action to terminate a preg-
nancy. Here, wewill focus on the questions that arise when the
selective termination of pregnancy is being considered. Given
that a woman and her partner wish to have a baby, under what
circumstances is it acceptable or proper (even ‘to be recom-
mended’) to investigate the embryo or foetus so as to make a
decision about whether to continue the pregnancy or to end it,
and perhaps try again. The key question is the process of
deciding between a current conception and possible future
conceptions: which are to be accepted and welcomed, and
which are to be rejected and terminated?
Here, we consider this by looking at three subsidiary
questions:
(i) How can prenatal screening or diagnosis be offered with-
out the offer in itself conveying a strong recommendation
(to accept the test and terminate the pregnancy, if the foetus
is affected)? Is this best approached from the perspective of
population health? Or should we concentrate our attention
and efforts on implementing an actively non-directive ap-
proach in prenatal clinic discussions? Furthermore, what
are the social conditions under which antenatal screening
for genetic conditions could be offered without the social
circumstances being, in effect, coercive?
(ii) How do we maintain respect for those affected by genet-
ic conditions and congenital defects while offering cou-
ples such reproductive decisions?
(iii) What difference will non-invasive prenatal testing
(whether diagnostic or screening) and population
screening for recessive disease carrier status make (a)
to the experience of pregnancy? and (b) to the experi-
ence of having an affected child?
Does offer = recommendation? In the setting of the routine
antenatal clinic, in which the offer of antenatal screening is
made and considered, there are many processes that could
routinise patient participation and thereby undermine the
achievement of non-directiveness. Some of these processes
depend upon the personalities and motivations of the profes-
sionals involved, but many will be impersonal and more struc-
tural, relating to clinic processes rather than the behaviour of
individual al staff. It may require hard, active work on the part
of staff to make it apparent to patients that they are being
offered a screening programme and that they need to consider
it carefully before climbing aboard the conveyor belt (Clarke
1991). However, the language used by practitioners may exert
a strong influence which they (we) should learn to check and
control. Examples of language use that needs to be watched
(and challenged) include ‘This test is to provide you with re-
assurance’ and ‘Most people do this…’ (Pilnick 2002). These
statements can be uttered in many different ways and with
quite contrary intentions but they may be understood (‘re-
ceived’) as being coercive, with the intention of directing pa-
tients to accept the ‘offer’ of routinised screening programmes.
In this context, it is helpful to reflect on the differences
between the three main approaches to ethics. While the
consequentialists look at the outcomes of reproductive deci-
sions—often adopting a perspective from which they are con-
fident in knowing a good decision when they see one—others
prefer to be guided by principles (especially the autonomy of
the pregnant woman), while virtue ethicists consider what it
means to be a good (enough) parent or professional, and what
decisions or actions such a parent or professional would be
likely to make or to undertake.
Savulescu and Kahne (2009) urge us all to bring into this
world the best quality infants that we can and to use all avail-
able technology to achieve this. Judgements about the ‘qual-
ity’ of infants, however, may be both highly contested and
insuperably complex; is a foetus with cystic fibrosis one to
be avoided? (Boslett 2011) There are questions of disease
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severity and treability to be considered. In addition, the con-
temporary focus on rights, especially the autonomy of the
pregnant woman, could lead to a supine acceptance of any
request made by a woman or couple but could also lead to
discussions about the place of women in society, which we
will return to in a later section. If women experience their lives
as a burden because they are powerless in a patriarchy, does
that make it acceptable to collude with the patriarchy and
terminate female foetuses so as to save them from the same
difficult lives as their oppressed mothers have lived? Finally,
at what point can or does a woman become unconditionally
committed to her foetus or child? Such commitment is
regarded as virtuous, as an integral part of the nurturing that
a good mother will provide (McDougall 2007). But does this
begin at conception? at quickening? at birth? or, as in some
ancient societies, once the child has survived the high mortal-
ity of early childhood? Or, in some more contemporary cir-
cumstances, the checks on ‘foetal quality’?
The consideration of a mother’s commitment to her infant
reminds one of a mother’s deferred commitment to her foetus
that Katz (1986) described so eloquently as a consequence of
the introduction of antenatal screening by amniocentesis:
commitment to the foetus//baby was delayed until the results
of chromosome testing were available. This deferral of com-
mitment, however, came at a social and personal cost. The
very experience of choice about participation in screening
can be experienced as a burden (van Berkel and van der
Weele 1999) and it is difficult, although perhaps not impossi-
ble, for this choice to be offered in a ‘neutral’ or non-directive
fashion (Clarke 1991; Rapp 2000;Williams et al. 2002). In the
routine antenatal clinic, discussions about screening for genet-
ic disorders often concentrate on the facts and not on the
meaning and weight of the decision to be made and its impli-
cations (Hodgson et al. 2010). The difficulty of the decisions
that mothers are asked to make has been explored in several
studies. The notion that the pregnant woman may feel a con-
flict between different ethical principles in coming to her de-
cision may not be the most helpful way to understand her
position. Instead, it may be recognised that she experiences a
conflict of interests between her foetus and other members of
the family, perhaps especially her other children (García et al.
2009).
For a couple to terminate a wanted pregnancy is always
going to be difficult and distressing. The long-term sequelae
of such terminations on the grounds of foetal abnormality
have not been much studied and the work of van Mourik
remains valuable (White-van Mourik et al. 1992; White-van
Mourik 1994). The support needs of the women and couples
involved are substantial and the recognition that the mother
sometimes has the moral role of taking on herself the suffering
of ‘the child who would have been born’ can be important.
A singularly helpful study of the decisions made by preg-
nant women (and their partners) about antenatal screening, as
well as other types of genetic testing, is that of Scully et al.
(2007), in which it is shown how women will often make a
series of microdecisions in a pregnancy, deferring any impor-
tant decision to the last possible moment. It can be too difficult
and challenging to confront their situation in its full complexity
and so they may focus on only what is immediately in front of
them. It will not usually be our role to confront those who
respond to events in this way in any but themost gentle fashion.
The situation of women considering prenatal diagnosis be-
cause of a known high risk of disease in their foetus, arising
from a family history of a rare disease, is very different from
the experience of women in routine antenatal screening. The
complex and agonising decisions to be made when a prospec-
tive parent is at risk of Huntington’s disease, for example, are
well recognised (Downing 2005; Klitzman et al. 2007).
Whenwe turn to a population focus on a single disease, and
look at the collective consequences of decisions made by
many individuals, it becomes clear how difficult it can be to
decide when a collectivist attempt to give families genetic
information and choices becomes an inappropriate attempt
to lead them to make specific decisions. Thus, the paper by
Helderman-van den Ende et al. (2013) on pregnancies at risk
of Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) shows that many
female carriers who could have been identified as carriers in
advance of the pregnancy had not in fact been identified.
Using a package of measures, including mutation testing on
chorionic biopsies found to be female at prenatal diagnoses for
risk of DMD and more effective family cascade testing, it
would be possible to recognise more female carriers before
they have affected sons. These carriers could then be offered
the opportunity to have genetic counselling. The stated con-
cern in this paper is to achieve the prevention of more cases of
DMD,while fully respecting the rights of the women involved
to make their own decisions. What perspective should one
adopt on this issue? Is the population-level concern appropri-
ate, or is it likely in practice to prove coercive, or at least
manipulative and directive? If we assert that genetic services
are merely working to ensure that prospective parents are able
to make informed reproductive decisions, is our response ad-
equate or are we evading the moral question at the heart of this
issue?
One recommendation of the paper (Helderman-van den
Ende et al. 2013) would be to adopt a different approach to
the genetic testing of children for carrier status. If we do this,
are we being eugenicist, i.e. protecting ‘Society’ from the
consequences of decisions made by family members who
have not faced up to their responsibilities, whether the deci-
sions are made actively or by default? Or are we simply im-
proving the services available to DMD families? How should
we discuss and evaluate the cumulative population conse-
quences of multiple decisions made by individuals?
In the context of countries that are poorer and less devel-
oped, how do the arguments play out in relation to genetic
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testing or population screening for carriers of beta-thalassae-
mia? (see also the “Ethical issues in our multi-cultural UK
society” section).
RespectDoes it devalue an individual with a genetic condition
if society chooses to establish antenatal screening programmes
to reduce the numbers of individuals born with the same con-
dition? Do they have a right to object that this is disrespectful
and promotes discrimination against them? This concern has
been labelled the expressivist objection to antenatal screening
programmes for genetic disorders.
One approach to this is to talk with those affected by Down
syndrome, for example, and see how the question of antenatal
screening ‘for’ (‘against’, perhaps?) their condition impacts
on them. As anyway feeling devalued, it is no surprise that
antenatal screening can add to their sadness (Alderson 2001;
Barter et al. 2017). This does not give affected individuals a
veto over such policy questions (Shakespeare 1998), but it
certainly reinforces the need to be as sensitive and respectful
as possible in the implementation of such a programme and
the need to take great care in producing information about
screening.What is one to say about Down syndrome to inform
prospective parents who have no personal experience of indi-
viduals with the condition? How can information be provided
in a ‘balanced’ manner, when one is proposing to eliminate
such individuals? (Hippman et al. 2012). The ‘twice-told
tales’ element—the difference in information provided during
pregnancy or after birth—was pointed out by Lippman and
Wilfond (1992) and applies as much today as ever before. If
we shift the provision of information to the preconception
setting, could that give prospective parents a chance to reflect
more calmly and come to a decision with which they can
subsequently feel confident (Schoonen et al. 2012)?
If we shift to consider disorders for which prenatal diagno-
sis may be sought by those with a family history, but which are
not generally included in antenatal screening, how are the
considerations different? What can we learn from reflecting
on them? In contrast to population screening programmes,
there will often be much less need to provide information
about the disorder, as it will often be well known to members
of the family. However, the factors that shape the decisions
about reproduction may have no less impact on affected mem-
bers of the family, who may be greatly saddened that a close
relative—a sister or brother, a son or daughter—has decided
not to risk having a child like they are. This is not the invari-
able response—some affected individuals would encourage
relatives not to transmit their condition—but it is a possible
response. It can be thought of as the ‘expressivist objection’ to
antenatal screening but at a much more personal and intimate
level, within the family. This has been studied recently within
families affected byX-linked hypohidrotic ectodermal dyspla-
sia (XHED) (Clarke 2013, 2016) and spinal muscular atrophy
(Boardman 2014a, b) and it is to be noted that the different
modes of inheritance (sex-linked and autosomal recessive,
respectively) alter the dynamics of decision-making within
families.
One aspect of coping with a genetic disorder, which also
often influences the making of reproductive decisions, con-
cerns the stigma attached to the specific condition. In XHED,
for example, the stigmatisation that affects many affected
males can be a major determinant of a female carrier’s deci-
sions about bearing children. She will often have seen her
male relatives struggle with the stigma and cope with varying
degrees of success. This may be at least as important a factor
in her decisions as the physical and clinical, medical problems
of life as an affected male. One wonders how this plays out in
other disorders, where there is a combination of physical
anomalies with unusual appearance and also, perhaps, some
cognitive impairment. Which aspects of these disorders is
most important for the affected person and for his or her rel-
atives? How major a contribution is made by the prospect of
stigmatisation? One study that gives some insight into the
strength of feeling around these issues is the interview-based
study of Kelly (2009), which shows how the parents of chil-
dren with serious disorders often prefer to avoid making de-
cisions about prenatal diagnosis that would cause inner con-
flict; they may avoid conceiving, or avoid prenatal diagnosis,
or at least avoid terminations of pregnancy. They choose not to
make choices.
Would we be comfortable with a decision about prenatal
diagnosis and the termination of an affected pregnancy on the
grounds of ‘the cost of care’? If wemean the cost of care borne
by the state, then we are back in the days of state-sponsored
eugenics. However, in these times of state retrenchment and
public austerity, what about concerns by families that they
would find it difficult to fund the facilities that their affected
child would be likely to require? One example put forward has
also related to XHED, where the costs of dental care may be
substantial (if dental implants are preferred to the much
cheaper dentures)? (Aldred et al. 2003). To paraphrase, con-
cisely but perhaps unfairly: ‘The termination costs less than
dental implants and we would not want our child to make do
with dentures’. How do we respond to that?
More generally, we can consider how—in what terms—to
discuss normality and disability. This maps across onto the
concepts of social inclusion or exclusion, normalisation or
marginalisation. There is a rich literature here that deserves
to be explored by those of us in clinical genetics, whose daily
work involves us in using but often not examining the con-
cepts of disability and normality (Bridgens 2009). This explo-
ration can usefully involve developing personal relationships
with disability rights groups to explore the issues, as well as a
purely theoretical engagement (Peterson 2012). Engagement
with the experience of those livingwith impairments can bring
valuable insights, both through personal relationships and
from second-hand encounters in the literature. Important
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studies and narrative accounts are available of life with nu-
merous genetic conditions, such as achondroplasia (Ablon
1984; Adelson 2005), neurofibromatosis type 1 (Ablon
2013) and HD, including the dimension of life with the risk
of HD (Konrad 2005; Browner and Preloran 2010). The ac-
counts of parents whose children have neurodevelopmental
difficulties from infancy, for whatever reason, have demon-
strated the recalibration of expectations of their child and of
their role as parent (Voysey 1975; Landsman 1998, 2003) that
is familiar also in ‘quality of life’ assessments of adults with a
range of impairments: those affected are much less dissatisfied
with their lives than ‘objective observers’ think would be ap-
propriate (Scully 2008). The implications of this can be read in
different ways. This question of how to read such different
perspectives is at the heart of the disability rights movement,
which is not prepared to concede that the lives of disabled
individuals are not as worthwhile as those of anyone else.
Studies of illness that are grounded in a phenomenological
perspective are bringing deep insights but have usually ad-
dressed acquired or later-onset disease (e.g. Carel 2016) rather
than congenital disorders manifest from birth: phenomenolog-
ical studies that address these conditions would be most
valuable.
The field of disability studies has flourished for some
decades. This has led to the firmer underpinning of ‘advo-
cacy’ and a strong link between the experience of disability
and its analysis within academia (Parens and Asch 2000;
Ablon op cit). There has been debate about whether it
makes sense to speak of a collective disability identity, or
whether the different types of disability and impairment are
too disparate for this to be coherent (Scully 2008). This
includes efforts to anchor the experience of physical and
sensory impairment in the sociology of the body. The field
of disability studies has also retained its sense of the social
roots of disability and the context from within which dis-
ablement arises (McLaughlin et al. 2008), and has
absorbed much from feminist theory (Woodin 2012).
Through activism and advocacy, it has also contributed to
the welfare of many with motor impairments, so that the
facilities for wheelchair users in the UK have improved
very substantially over the past four decades. The repre-
sentation of the experiences of those with cognitive impair-
ment is less developed; those with severe cognitive impair-
ment may be especially vulnerable to having their status as
fully human persons undermined (Edwards 2006).
One particular area in which further empirical investigation
and conceptual clarification would be expected to be im-
mensely helpful is that of the disorders of sexual development
and gender assignment decisions in infancy, where ‘treatment’
and even surgery may be driven by parents’ confusion and
their understandable distress but where such pressures may
in the long run work to the detriment of the patient (Feder
and Karkazis 2008).
Reproduction into the future Finally, in this section, we turn
to consider some of the new technologies and how their ap-
plication to reproduction may change the experience of preg-
nancy and raise new issues or raise familiar issues but more
powerfully.
With the advent of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT)
through the sequencing of cell-free DNA in the maternal plas-
ma, a modest fraction of which derives from the foetus (tech-
nically, the chorion), several questions arise. At present, wom-
en who are reluctant to undergo any sort of prenatal genetic
screening can explain that they wish to protect the pregnancy
from the risk of miscarriage associated with invasive proce-
dures. This account of why she declines a screening test may
be used to justify herself to the professionals or to critics
within the family. The advent of NIPT undermines this ‘ex-
cuse’ and may make it harder for her to sustain her avoidance
of testing. To what extent this is an important consideration—
how widespread this practice has been—is unknown but it is
clear that NIPT has the potential to become even more
routinised than the current types of antenatal screening, with
consequences for the validity of consent for such tests (van
den Heuvel et al. 2010).
While NIPT may complicate the decisions of those reluc-
tant to use prenatal diagnosis, it will in other ways bring some
very clear benefits in that fewer miscarriages are likely to
result from invasive procedures as fewer will be performed.
NIPT can operate as either a first-tier screening test or an
intermediate tier (between the first tier of serum-plus-nuchal-
translucency screening and invasive procedures). NIPT is sub-
stantially more sensitive and specific than current first tier
screening so there will be many fewer amniocenteses and
fewer miscarriages. However, it is important to remember that
the positive predictive value (PPV) of NIPT for Down syn-
drome (DS) varies with the chance of DS in that pregnancy
and is far short of 100%; for a standard risk pregnancy (not
already known to be at higher risk) the PPV is about 80%; as a
second tier test, its PPV is at least 90% (Taylor-Phillips et al.
2016; Nuffield Council 2017).
If a majority of pregnant women continue to use antenatal
screening, the proportion of DS foetuses that are identified
through screening and then terminated will increase, so the
number of infants with DS at birth will decrease. How will
this be experienced by current and future persons with DS?
And by their families and the professionals who care for and
support them? There will certainly be some sadness (Skotko
2009). How do we place a value on this, when we see DS as
another way of being human rather than a disorder? This is
where the question of ‘balance’ in representation becomes so
important but, ultimately, cannot be achieved. On the one
hand, DS may be seen as a ‘disorder’, as it can have grave
medical consequences as well as sometimes a very severe
impact on cognitive development. On the other hand, many
with DS experience fulfilling lives and make a positive
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contribution to the lives of those around them. The problem is
that the different ways in which DS is being examined may be
incommensurable.
As screening by NIPT is implemented more widely, the
range of disorders it is being used to identify is also broaden-
ing out to include many recognised chromosome
microdeletion syndromes. The decision as to what conditions
to include in screening seems at present to be driven largely by
considerations of marketing, with companies seeking to claim
that their NIPT test “covers more” than their competitors.
However, the performance of the test changes as new condi-
tions are added to the testing package, and the PPV for addi-
tional tests is usually lower than for DS, so that the advantage
of NIPT over other approaches to screening for the autosomal
trisomies may be lost: the number of invasive tests performed,
and so also the number of procedure-related miscarriages,
would both increase. These and related issues are considered
with care in a recent report (Nuffield Council 2017).
What other conditions may be included in screening, be-
yond chromosome deletions? Women should be aware that
incidental findings may emerge, including (rarely) evidence
of malignancy. Will parents pay to find out about traits or
predispositions for which there may be no clinical utility
(and would therefore not be included in evidence-based health
care)? It may also be possible to assess the foetus for non-
medical traits or for adult-onset disorders, for which it would
usually be regarded as inappropriate to test young children
(Deans et al. 2014). Where should society draw limits as to
what is permitted, or should this be left to each individual in
the marketplace?
Foetal sex is another trait that parents may be interested to
determine early in a pregnancy. While superficially harmless,
this may be used to terminate pregnancies carrying a female
foetus in societies that devalue women. Indeed, late termina-
tions of female pregnancies (after ultrasound scans) have very
substantially skewed the sex ratio at birth in parts of India and
China. As an act of solidarity, we believe that foetal sex should
not be determined by NIPT except when it is clinically rele-
vant in relation to a sex-linked disease (Nuffield Council
2017).
The combination of NIPT and carrier detection by high-
throughput DNA sequencing has the potential to eliminate
not only Down syndrome but also, in western countries and
wealthy countries elsewhere, all chromosome copy number
anomalies (at least all recognised pathogenic deletions and
duplications) and virtually all cases of autosomal recessive
disease (Edwards et al. 2015; Human Genetics Commission
2011). There would clearly be difficulties with the implemen-
tation of such a programme, especially the problem of se-
quence variants of uncertain pathogenicity that are detected
in autosomal recessive loci. However, there would in addition
be profound consequences if ‘society’ were either to make a
collective decision to prevent the birth of people affected by
these conditions, or allow social pressures to work to the same
end for those who could afford the technology. Society in
general, and health care in particular, would look very differ-
ent. The argument against screening would lead us to remain
in our present situation, where prenatal diagnosis to avoid the
birth of a child with a serious recessive disorder is only avail-
able once a couple has had at least one affected child. Should
prenatal diagnosis and the selective termination of an affected
foetus only be available under those circumstances? (Why?)
This brave new future, with few children affected by chro-
mosomal or autosomal recessive disorders, could be repre-
sented either as a major triumph or as an inhuman dystopia,
in which something vital has been lost. How are we to make
up our minds?
Another challenge that will soon arrive in the clinic is that of
rational, gene-based therapies that can be applied in utero. The
circumstances in which such treatments may be preferred to the
current use of prenatal diagnosis and the selective termination
of affected pregnancies will have to be considered and defined.
Cost will be a major issue: will private or state-backed health
insurance schemes or national health care schemes be willing to
provide such treatments if they are both costly and of uncertain
or incomplete effectiveness? (The field is reviewed from a
multidisciplinary perspective in Schmitz et al. 2018).
Genetic testing of (young) children
We have already discussed some of the issues that are raised
by the genetic testing of young people in the ‘Predictive ge-
netic testing consent, competence and (non)directiveness’ sec-
tion. Here, we turn to consider decisions about genetic testing
of young children, who are unable to participate in the discus-
sions and decisions about this. What genetic information is it
appropriate to generate about young children?
We take for granted that diagnostic testing is (almost) al-
ways appropriate, if the cause is being sought for a clinical
condition currently affecting a patient of any age. When a sick
child is being investigated, it may be wise to raise in advance
with the parents the possibility that the disorder may be ge-
netic, perhaps with familial implications, but that is not a rea-
son for not performing the investigation. What must be con-
sidered is when it would be appropriate to perform tests of no
relevance to the child before s/he reaches maturity. This in-
cludes predictive genetic testing for adult-onset disorders and
carrier testing for autosomal recessive disorders, or for sex-
linked disorders and chromosome rearrangements.
While reflecting on this, there are some subsidiary ques-
tions to consider.
& How do children find out about the problem in their family?
& What are the factors to be considered in relation to the
predictive testing of young children for an adult-onset
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condition, or carrier status testing for any disorder, when
the condition is already known to run in their family (when
the child is too young to participate in the decision-
making)?
& Does the weight of these arguments change when inciden-
tal findings emerge from testing a young child, of which
the family would otherwise be unaware?
& When is it reasonable to test a young child as a preliminary
to arranging their adoption?
Finding out
Perhaps the first question to consider, before thinking
about genetic testing, is how children come to find out
about a genetic condition in the family. In discussing with
parents in clinic ‘how to tell the children’, it would be
common to encourage open disclosure but in a gentle and
age-appropriate manner, in contrast to the idea of keeping
the problem secret and then planning a disclosure session
as a single, discrete event. Such an event could be daunting
for the parent and emotionally traumatic for the child, if
they are old enough to appreciate what is being said. The
decision not to mislead or deceive but to give the informa-
tion sought by a child over time, as they mature, is a policy
that is simple to recommend but there have been few stud-
ies of how parents do in fact communicate difficult genetic
information to their children.
The first study to address this issue is probably that of
Manjoney and McKegnay (1978), which described the cy-
cles of non- or mis-communication between generations in
families affected by polycystic kidney disease. A failure to
pass on information in a timely and supportive manner
condemns the next generation to discover their diagnosis
in the same difficult, and sometimes catastrophic, fashion
as their parent had done. A few studies have reported the
experience of communication within families affected by
Huntington’s disease. Holt (2006) reported the experience
of two contrasting families, and came down strongly in
favour of a drip-drip trickle of information: a gentle, sup-
ported and slow-paced disclosure of information to chil-
dren. Etchegary (2006) reported a typology of patterns of
discovery, with four trajectories of finding out: (i) ‘some-
thing’ is wrong; (ii) out of the blue, (iii) knowing but
dismissing, and (iv) growing up with HD. It is the period
of ignorance before finding out that shapes the account
given by the ‘child’ (perhaps by now an adult) about their
recognition of their situation of risk.
One large study has looked at these issues in the context of
several disorders and found that children prefer the slow and
gentle drip feed of information over time (Metcalfe et al.
2011). Further research in this area, in other disease contexts,
would be important and worthwhile.
Current policy
Numerous professional bodies have recommended caution,
at least, in performing genetic tests on children unless it is
clearly a diagnostic test (to explain a problem affecting the
child now) or is needed to arrange treatment, prevention or
health surveillance during childhood (British Society for
Human Genetics 2010; Borry et al. 2009 for the
European Society of Human Genetics ESHG; Botkin et
al. (2015) for the American Society of Human Genetics
ASHG; and Ross et al. 2013 for the American Academy
of Pediatrics AAP and the American College of Medical
Genetics and Genomics ACMG). These position state-
ments are very similar, except that the AAP/ACMG state-
ment, but not the ASHG policy, has been disappointingly
weakened from its previous joint position with the ASHG
from 1995. These more cautious policies are based on two
considerations (i) that it is important to preserve the auton-
omy of the child so that, as a future adult, she is able to
make her own decision about testing. This in effect applies
one understanding of Feinberg’s concept of an Open
Future to this area of competing rights and interests, and
(ii) that testing the child as a child results in the loss of
privacy of their test result and may harm the child if it
influences parental or institutional behaviour towards her,
with scope for (perhaps subtle) discrimination between sib-
lings whose test results differ.
A libertarian or an enthusiast for testing children might
argue that such decisions should be left to parents, who often
make proxy decisions for their children, and this decision
should be treated as no different. The drawback of such an
approach is that many parents will want to know the genetic
status of their child for any disorder that runs in the family.
Once they have tested the child, that information will be
known within the family but it removes the possibility of the
child playing a key part in discovering the information. This
may be especially important if adjustment to an unfavourable
result is substantially better when the at-risk individual has
made their own active decision about testing as a ‘mature
enough’ adult and has not had testing imposed on them when
younger.
The shift in policy between the previous ASHG/ACMG
policy and the current AAP/ACMG document (Ross et al.
2013) is contained in this sentence, ‘After careful genetic
counselling, it may be ethically acceptable to proceed with
predictive genetic testing to resolve disabling parental anxiety
or to support life-planning decisions that parents sincerely
believe to be in the child’s best interests’. This could be seen
as an invitation to any parents focused on their ‘right to know
their child’s genetics’ to claim that they are disabled by anx-
iety, or that they need to take the child’s genetic status into
account in making important decisions (such as, presumably,
investment in their education or health). It is unclear to us that
18 J Community Genet (2019) 10:3–33
testing would in fact be justified under such circumstances and
this policy formulation appears too open to abuse, especially
in a country with a largely private system of health care.
In one ‘ideal’ scenario, information that is not clinically
indicated or useful until the child is mature would not be
generated until then. The ‘child’—by then a Young Person
or perhaps a mature adult—makes the decision to be tested.
Their involvement in the decision, with appropriate
counselling support, gives them a choice and makes it eas-
ier for them to accept an adverse result whereas, for a
parent to give them an adverse result generated years be-
fore may be very difficult for the parent and may lead to
anger, resentment, disbelief or rejection on the part of the
‘child’. The testing will have been performed in childhood
at the request of the parent(s) and for their own reasons.
The child’s interests have been overridden by the parents’
(often misplaced) concern or by curiosity labelled as “dis-
abling anxiety”. If the professionals comply with the inap-
propriate parental request, they are very likely to have been
negligent of the best interests of the child. This sets up
problems for the future, with perhaps a failure ever to dis-
close the result to the child, or a disclosure made in diffi-
cult, perhaps damaging, circumstances.
We know that carrier information generated about young
children or a foetus is often not transmitted to the child (Jolly
et al. 1998; Jarvinen et al. 1999); the same question has not
been studied in relation to ‘clinically inappropriate’ predictive
testing, but our experience of inappropriate parental requests
leads us to believe that they are likely to find it even more
difficult to pass on that type of information.
Our ‘ideal scenario’ has the advantage of demonstrating
trust in the child to make a wise decision about testing, which
creates an opportunity for personal growth in both parent and
child.
The case against testing a child without a clear medical
indication will not always be so strong. In carrier testing for
autosomal recessive disease there may be much less at stake
than in predictive testing for HD. If families can accept such
carrier information and pass it to their children in an open and
constructive way, then much may be gained and little lost by
the early testing (Vears and Metcalfe 2015). In testing for
carriers of sex-linked and chromosomal disorders, however,
the chance of unhelpful consequences is greater, such as the
stigmatisation of carriers and altered expectations of their fu-
ture roles and relationships. Such problems are still more like-
ly to occur in late-onset dominant disorders where there is no
health benefit from testing in childhood. Professional discus-
sion of many varied scenarios is presented in Arribas-Ayllon
et al. (2009) and Parker (2012). Problems may arise when
family loyalty to an affected sibling is in tension with the
welfare of future children, as with carrier testing in the unaf-
fected sibs of those with X-linked disease (James et al. 2003)
or autosomal recessive disease (Fanos and Johnson 1995a, b).
Other difficulties arise with predictive genetic testing if it is
difficult for the parents or the children to live with the results.
Although they have existed for some years, we still find some
predictive information difficult to handle and to explain to
parents. Tests that indicate a substantial risk of behaviour
problems in childhood and of schizophrenia in adolescence
and adult life are very difficult for parents to manage
(Hercher and Bruenner 2008). How does one respond to the
difficult behaviour of a child who (one fears) may be destined
to develop psychosis? Does one give in to all challenges so as
not to cause frustration and resentment? Or adopt a ‘zero tol-
erance’ approach of very firm boundaries? Or try to treat the
child as if one had not been given this information? And if
your child is found to be at risk of sudden cardiac death
(Hendriks et al. 2005), how does one decide what pattern of
exercise and social life to recommend? And how can this be
enforced? As discussed in the ‘Predictive genetic testing con-
sent, competence and (non)directiveness’ section 3, some
families in which children were tested for their cardiomyopa-
thy have regretted the decision to arrange the testing (Geelen
et al. 2011). It will be important for researchers to build long-
term relationships with families in which these issues arise if
we are to gain insight into responses to different patterns of
professional practice.
Incidental findings
An additional consideration about testing children for late-
onset genetic disorders has arisen in the setting of genome-
wide testing, especially exome and whole genome se-
quencing. The incidental identification of a (probably)
pathogenic variant, likely to lead to a late-onset disorder
such as cardiac disease or a malignancy, may occur in a
child who is being tested to determine the cause of a dif-
ferent condition, perhaps a complex neurodevelopmental
disorder. If the family has so far been unaware of this risk,
then this incidental recognition of a disorder may, in some
circumstances, be very helpful as one of the parents is
likely to carry the same pathogenic variant. Recognising
this may be to the parent’s great clinical benefit, and hence
to the benefit of the child too.
This approach was proposed by a working group of the
American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics
(ACMG), being proposed as a requirement for any genome
sequencing of children, whether in research or diagnosis
(Green et al. 2013). A list of 56 genes was to be examined
with the disclosure of pathogenic variants, whether or not
any prior consent had been obtained. This policy was sub-
sequently revised by the ACMG Board in 2014 with the
concession that disclosure should not be required without
prior discussion and parental consent, which brings the
ACMG recommendations more into line with those of oth-
er bodies such as the ESHG.
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While the ACMG policy has some strong arguments to
recommend it, the provocative wording of the initial policy
and the rush to see it implemented betrays the True Believer
enthusiasm of somemembers of the working group. There is a
vision of a person’s genome sequence being available
throughout their life as a resource for use in making any health
care decision. However, there are both technical and ethical
problems with this. What we accept as a genome sequence
will not be the same in 10 or even 5 years as is current today
and the practicalities of data storage are not simple, so that
repeating the genome sequencing when required may be a
better solution than long term data storage with its difficulties
of perpetually needing to update the IT systems, both software
and hardware, and of ensuring privacy and data security
(Chadwick et al. 2013; Clarke 2014). There are also political
difficulties with this model of genetics in health care, includ-
ing the inappropriate individualisation of health policy and the
neglect of equity. Despite these quibbles about the details,
however, the ACMG report did set out a convincing case that
the incidental recognition of a late-onset genetic disorder in a
child should generally be disclosed to the family, unless it is
known that the family is already aware of the problem identi-
fied. A decision not to seek genetic testing by one who knows
s/he is at risk is altogether different from their failure to seek
testing because they are ignorant of the risk.
Adoption
When we turn to adoption, there are other challenges.
Health professionals are usually reluctant to carry out ge-
netic testing on a child being considered for adoption if
the test would not usually be performed on that child
under different social circumstances. In contrast, those
from a social work background may see the long-term
advantages to the child of being adopted as crucial to
the child’s future. If that takes one or two additional ge-
netic tests, then a successful adoption would be well
worth the price. How do we resolve this difference in
perspective, when both paediatricians and social workers
are involved in the adoption process?
The restrictive view of genetic testing in adoption has been
put forward by several authors (Morris et al. 1988; Newson
and Leonard 2010) and challenged by others, who see that the
interests of a child may indeed be bound up in the outcome of
a decision about adoption (Jansen and Ross 2001). It has also
been argued that genetic testing, even a genome sequence,
may be appropriate in children being considered for adoption
because the family history information available to the pro-
spective adopters is often poor and the genome sequence will
compensate for this (May et al. 2015). Counter arguments to
this last claim are numerous and persuasive, for the present, as
the interpretation of a genome sequence is still far from
straightforward and the introduction of yet more genomic
uncertainty into the portfolio of information about the child
is unlikely to help the prospects of her or him being adopted.
The debate so far has largely related to information about a
known risk, most often Huntington’s disease (HD). While
health professionals may be more open to persuasion in rela-
tion to genetic testing for some cancer predispositions, such
flexibility is much less likely in relation to HD given the small
number of those at risk who seek testing as adults, the great
potential for stigmatisation and discrimination, the altered ex-
pectations likely to be held by parents about the child with an
adverse result, and fear for the child’s future (including the
prospects for being adopted) if s/he tests positive. Improving
prospects for treatment may alter this but, as yet, they are still
too remote and uncertain.
The force of the ‘ideal’ setting discussed above is still ap-
plicable in the setting of a possible adoption, with the impli-
cation being that the ideal adoptive parents are those who can
accept that the child has a risk of future disease but are willing
to adopt in any case, without insisting on certainty either way.
If there were an excess of prospective adopters, then a
‘Judgement of Solomon’ solution might apply. Whether or
not that surfeit of adopters is to be found for any particular
child will vary between communities and countries.
The other setting in which genetic tests are considered in
relation to adoption is chromosome evaluation for
neurodevelopmental difficulties, with the method now in use
being array comparative genomic hybridisation (aCGH). This
has largely replaced chromosome analysis but the paediatri-
cians engaged in adoption work are still often finding (at least
in the UK) that the greater diagnostic yield of aCGH is ac-
companied by a challenging injection of uncertainties from the
variants of uncertain significance (VUSs) in the result and,
less often, the incidental findings of disease risk for some
other problem in the birth family. Of these difficulties of in-
terpretation, it is the VUSs that impact on the adoption pro-
cess. Prospective adoptive parents may be willing to adopt a
child with known learning difficulties, whether or not there is
an explanation apparent on chromosome studies, but less will-
ing to accept a child where there is a cloud of uncertainty
around the interpretation of the aCGH report.
One can foresee the time when genome-wide investiga-
tion of children to be adopted might become standard prac-
tice, at least in some jurisdictions, although we would pre-
fer to continue without generating such clinically inappro-
priate datasets. The notion that genomic investigation will
compensate for the lack of a detailed family history in a
child being adopted is not scientifically plausible and cer-
tainly not a convincing reason to override the usual con-
siderations of medical ethics. Furthermore, if genomic in-
vestigations are performed on a child being considered for
adoption, or already adopted, a plan must be in place as to
how to pass potentially important findings to the birth fam-
ily, if they arise.
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High-throughput testing for genetic disorders
High-throughput investigations have transformed biology as a
science. Instead of experimental design for the testing of hy-
potheses, the frontier of research is now the development of
tools for data interpretation: making sense from the data. The
same change has impacted on clinical investigations: it is no
longer so difficult to generate sequence information, but it can
be very challenging to make useful diagnostic sense of it for
the individual patient. The history of human laboratory genet-
ics was the focusing onto progressively smaller details—
starting with the chromosome and working through linkage
studies with close markers, to the specific gene and then its
sequence, looking for point mutations. Over the last decade,
however, that level of detail has become available across the
whole genome at a single step, the whole genome sequence
(WGS).
Given this fundamental shift in the methods of laboratory
genetics (Clarke et al. 2012), it is now necessary to choose
what information to attend to and to pass along the chain from
laboratory scientist to bioinformaticist to clinician, and then
further, to the patient and family. While it is possible to pass
the entireWGS to the patient as a data file, this would miss the
point: patients look to health professionals for more than that.
They want and require an interpretation and recommendations
that are supported by the available evidence.
What difficulties are raised by these new circumstances?
The two major problems to address have already been met
above: (i) variants of uncertain significance (VUSs) and (ii)
incidental findings (IFs), also known by other terms such as
‘off-target’, ‘additional’ or ‘secondary’ findings.
Incidental findings and variants of uncertain
significance
VUSs are not entirely new to genetics, of course. They have
been recognised for as long as laboratory genetics has existed,
but it is the scale of the problem that is new. The principal
current approach to VUSs is that advocated by Berg et al.
(2013) and subsequently adapted by ACMG (Richards et al.
2015) of a systematic approach to classifying each VUS as
being more or less likely to result in disease, using five ‘bins’
to one of which each variant is assigned (not pathogenic;
unlikely to be pathogenic; of uncertain pathogenicity; likely
pathogenic; definitely pathogenic). The grounds on which
these assignments are made are well recognised and will not
be rehearsed here except to note that surprises can occur: a
likely pathogenic variant may be reassigned to the ‘definitely
not pathogenic’ bin, as new information and experience
accumulates, or a variant thought likely not to be pathogenic
may turn out to be pathogenic. The process of making these
assignments is described by Timmermans (2015) in a study
that examines the trust placed by laboratory scientists in their
laboratory and bioinformatic processes and in each other and
in their clinicial colleagues. They then make judgements as to
which variants, in which genes, should be reported to the
clinician who has requested the investigation. The clinician
will then pass to the patient or parents the clinically important,
‘definite’ results that are relevant to the patient’s problem, but
then has to decide when to report any of the other results,
especially if a VUS has been found in a gene thought likely
to be relevant to the disease in the family. If this VUS may be
pathogenic and further investigation may clarify this, then of
course it must be disclosed, although that will sometimes lead
to families misunderstanding this; they may believe that the
VUS must be pathogenic and act on that misunderstanding.
The variants found may be sequence variants or copy num-
ber variants (CNVs). CNVs are detected by array comparative
genomic hybridisation (aCGH) as well as by sequencing
methods, especially WGS (Boone et al. 2013). There is more
experience with reporting CNVs to families than sequence
variants but they still generate many difficulties for both the
clinician and the patient or family: how does one ‘act on’ or
understand a CNV result that indicates a modest susceptibility
to attention deficit disorder, autistic traits, schizophrenia or
intellectual disability? Information has to be imparted in a
very tentative manner to help prevent families jumping to
unwarranted conclusions.
Addressing only the question of IFs, and restricting this to
only the 56 genes that ACMG initially recommended for as-
sessment for possible IFs, one recent study found that the
mean number of likely pathogenic variants was 1.69 per pa-
tient (Jurgens et al. 2015). Broadening out toWGS as a whole,
there are even more serious problems of interpretation. The
level of uncertainty of interpretation of many of the variants
found when performing WGS on healthy volunteers, the in-
complete sequencing coverage (even of known disease
genes), and the inadequate knowledge base for deciding when
to trigger further diagnostic investigations (Dewey et al. 2014)
suggest that WGS may be best regarded as a research investi-
gation rather than a regular clinical tool, except as a last resort
in the face of serious disease without a diagnosis, and when
the clinician has made her best efforts using currently
established methods.
Consent and Recontacting
When explaining WGS, aCGH, clinical exome analysis or
even a large gene panel to a patient or family, it is essential
that the issues of VUSs and IFs are discussed. Without that,
valid consent cannot have been given to the investigation.
However, it is here important to take a short detour into the
question of consent more generally. ‘Taking consent’ and,
‘giving’ it are the two sides of one activity, a social encounter.
What is going on for the two (or more) participants in this
encounter? The professional will want to put on a convincing
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performance as a competent, caring and ethical professional
but, at the same time, s/he will want to ‘get the box ticked’ and
move on to the next task. Similarly, the patient or parent will
(usually) wish to perform as a sensible and responsible patient
or parent but may not want to read through pages of typescript
in a small font and, in any case, may be too anxious really to
consider the details of what is being proposed. This will often
be a recipe for collusion between both parties to have a brief
but not challenging or intense discussion, so that neither party
has to dwell on it. They can hurry through the consent step as
not much more than a formality. Further work is needed to
examine ‘what is going on for the participants’ in the setting of
consent for diagnostic genomics, along the lines of work by
Corrigan (2003) on clinical trials and Shipman et al. (2014) on
biobanking.
Consent for genomic investigations has to be ‘broad’
(Helgesson 2012). The line between diagnostic and research
procedures may (understandably) be blurred—as in the
100,000 Genomes Project of NHS England - so the need to
avoid the misunderstanding that participation in the research
will have therapeutic value (i.e. the ‘therapeutic misconcep-
tion’ familiar from drug trials) is clear (Halverson and Ross
2012).
The initial suggestion of ACMG (Green et al. 2013) that
information be returned even without prior consent was
flawed but useful in at least three ways: (i) it stimulated inter-
est and debate, (ii) it set a defensible limit on the list of loci
about which IFs should be returned, thereby reining in the
potential competition between research groups and among
commercial companies in what IFs would be sought and
disclosed, and (iii) it drew attention to the difference between
the usual ‘Genetic Testing of Children’ scenario, where there
is a family history of a specific disorder, and this very different
situation in which there is often no prior awareness of a ge-
netic diagnosis in the family so that there could well be further
casualties of the condition (perhaps the parents or other rela-
tives) if the incidental finding were not acted upon. The de-
tailed composition of the ACMG list can be debated, and has
been revised (with four additions to, and one removal from,
the list that now totals 59 genes: Kalia et al. 2017) but the
principle has been established of reporting back to families
if a clinically important and actionable IF is found for the
benefit of the family as a whole (not only the child).
Previously known disorders within a family are of course
excluded from this, and disclosure of these additional findings
to the parents must have been raised with them as part of the
process of ‘information and consent’, so that they should have
agreed to this possibility in advance. This respects the
(contested) ‘right not to know’. However, the potential social
costs of this ‘right’—in terms of either failing to respect con-
sidered personal decisions or denying their relatives access to
potentially important health care—are clearly overwhelming.
The case for exempting information of clinical utility
generated about children from the ‘right not to know’ is very
strong. A parental decision not to consider information of
likely practical clinical benefit to their child, or perhaps to
their parents or siblings, could hardly have been guided by
the overall best interests of the others involved.
It will also be necessary to address two other areas in the
consent process: (i) which results should be returned to the
patient (or parents)? and (ii) when or how often should find-
ings be reassessed? The question of what results to return has
generated a lot of debate in the clinical and bioethics litera-
tures. Research is simpler—the obligations on researchers are
less complex—if only aggregated results are given back to
participants (Beskow et al. 2012). Indeed, that was all that
would have been sensible when GWAS results were at issue.
With sequencing results (exome or WGS), however, the find-
ings of each individual are of much greater potential signifi-
cance. This alters the situation dramatically (Tabor et al. 2011;
Kaye et al. 2014). The PHG Foundation (Hall et al. 2013) and
Knoppers et al. (2014, 2015) have proposed helpful frame-
works for those generating sequence information in the re-
search setting.
In clinical practice, the process of consent for paediatric
genome-wide investigation has been studied in several set-
tings. Lessons have been learned about the minimum infor-
mation that should be provided and discussed with parents
(Burke and Clarke 2016). In a research setting in Toronto,
the attitudes of the parents of children having genomic inves-
tigations for the purpose of a diagnostic assessment have been
assessed and are of real interest (Anderson et al. 2017). The
participants, a small and somewhat atypical subset of those
whose children were being investigated in the hospital’s
Genome Clinic, described their sense of having difficult and
even distressing findings ‘inflicted’ on them but feeling un-
able to opt out of receiving these additional//incidental find-
ings because of their sense of a burdensome duty to know all
the potential problems that might face their child (an ‘inflicted
ought’). In an insightful commentary, Newson reminds us that
the parents’ response to IFs is specific to the setting of this
particular clinic, where at least some parents felt that the un-
wanted information had indeed been inflicted upon them,
when they were at best ambivalent about receiving it
(Newson 2017). This arose out of the requirement to agree
to receive IFs as a condition of accessing the diagnostic appli-
cation of the WGS.
In relation to consent for genome investigations in children,
the decisions will usually be made by their parents ‘in the
child’s best interests’ (Ross, 2013). In the UK, there is no
arbitrary line drawn at a specific age, before which it must
be the parent who gives consent for medical investigations
and treatments. Where a child of less than 16 years has some
capacity to be involved in the discussion, this will be encour-
aged and they may give their views. The patient may be able
to assent to medical procedures but the parent(s) will usually
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take responsibility for formally providing consent. Even
young children can make important contributions to the deci-
sions made about them, and research into consent to elective
surgery in childhood has demonstrated this with great effect
(Alderson 1993). Between 16 and 18 years, either the child or
the parents can give consent to treatment. From the age of
18 years, a patient will be presumed to have the capacity to
give consent unless there are grounds for considering that s/he
may lack capacity, in which case their capacity has to be
assessed. As mentioned earlier in the context of predictive
testing, young people of less than 16 years can give consent,
and in limited circumstances even refuse consent, as long as
they can demonstrate adequate maturity of judgement. The
essential test for those of less than 16 years is ‘Gillick compe-
tence’, as established by a court ruling under the Common
Law of England & Wales, in which the test is whether the
child has achieved, ‘sufficient understanding and intelligence
to understand fully what is proposed’.
For adults, capacity is framed as the ability, with support if
necessary, ‘to understand the information they are given; re-
tain that information for long enough to make a decision;
weigh up the information; and communicate their decision’.
It is important to appreciate that capacity is not a single attri-
bute but varies, being specific to the particular question at
issue, and even fluctuating with the same person over time.
The question of when (and how often) to reinterpret any
VUS results has also been widely discussed. With the rapidly
increasing numbers of VUSs and the accumulation of infor-
mation and experience about variants, the status of VUSs can
change, with their status as pathogenic or benign usually be-
coming clearer. That, however, raises the question of how
genetic services could periodically re-evaluate all the VUSs
they have identified, and then how they could contact the
patients whose variants had changed in a clinicallymeaningful
fashion. What obligation has a service to take on this chal-
lenge? How can the costs of this additional service be met,
when these are likely to escalate exponentially for a decade or
more before any sort of stability of variant interpretation is
reached? These issues remain challenging although construc-
tive work to find solutions is in process. One difficulty with
some proposals is that they rely on a pro-active engagement
with the patients and families involved (Pyeritz 2011;
Dheensa et al. 2017). This would certainly mean that only
some of those who could benefit from ‘recontact’ will do so,
is highly likely to be socially inequitable, and could well drive
an increase in such inequity (Tudor Hart 1971).
What about investigations whose results are of little or no
validity or applicability? The giving of information of no clin-
ical utility, such as GWAS-based risk modifications, would
not be regarded as equivalent to the disclosure of IFs.
However, such results may be of interest in one way: if an
increased risk of disease is assigned to the patient based on
GWAS-related risks, does it lead to the modification of
behaviour that would be recommended in the light of that
genetic susceptibility? This type of personally assessed dis-
ease risk does not seem to lead to the ‘appropriate’ behaviour
change: it does not tap into a strong, additional motivator to
encourage compliance (Marteau et al. 2010; McBride et al.
2010). In any case, such ‘advice’ is consistent neither over
time, as more or different SNPs are utilised, nor between test
providers. What is of much more ethical concern is the ineq-
uity of access to genome-based and DNA sequencing-based
investigations of proven value, which comes down to a ques-
tion of the political system within which health care is being
provided (McClellan et al. 2013).
An overview of the issues raised by the ‘genomic ap-
proach’ to clinical genetics is given by Clarke (2014), follow-
ing a broader assessment of the science as well as the clinical
implications (Clarke et al. 2012). A very helpful ethics-based
framework for assessing the applicability of genome-based
investigations in paediatric practice has been formulated by
McCullough et al. (2015). A likewise constructive suggestion
from Newson and colleagues is that genomic investigations
should be approached in professional training and in discus-
sions between patients and professionals as an exercise of
uncertainty management: the ethos of genomics is uncertainty
and this should be acknowledged and embraced (Newson et
al. 2016).
Newborn metabolic screening and whole genome
sequencing in the newborn and the foetus
As with the shift from focused to genome-wide investigations
in laboratory genetics, biochemical screening of newborn in-
fants for metabolic disorders has changed fundamentally with
the introduction of tandem mass spectrometry (TMS). This
has greatly increased the capacity of screening in terms of
the volume of samples analysed in one laboratory and also
the scope of what is screened for: TMS is able to identify a
much wider range of different molecules than the previous,
chromatography-based methods. This technological shift has
greatly expanded the number of metabolic disorders that can
be detected by screening.
This in turn makes it possible to identify newborns affected
by (or destined to become affected by) disorders that do not
fulfil the conventional, 1968 WHO criteria for screening de-
vised by Wilson and Jungner. The key mismatch between
these criteria and the new possibilities is that early diagnosis
often fails to lead to improved outcomes for the infant because
there is no effective treatment.
If the inclusion of a disorder in a newborn screening pro-
gramme fails to meet the established criteria for screening,
why might it nevertheless be a reasonable course of action?
One response is that the parents become aware of the child’s
diagnosis sooner than if they waited for the child to present
with symptoms. They avoid the extended diagnostic process
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that might otherwise result, which can be an ordeal reminis-
cent of the Odyssey. They are spared this process, reported
vividly in the case of Duchenne muscular dystrophy (Firth et
al. 1983). The average time lag between the family seeking
medical advice and achieving a diagnosis was 23 months in
one study; we have no reason to think it has improved. Late
diagnosis is a serious problem in many disorders (e.g.
Bouwman et al. 2013).
The other major factor is that this earlier diagnosis enables
parents to take account of the diagnosis in their plans for
(further) children. They may then be able to make future re-
productive decisions in the light of their risk of having affected
children (Bombard et al. 2009). Newborn screening for DMD
has shown that (most) families appreciate the early diagnosis,
if they havemade an active decision for the screen for DMD to
be included in their infant’s newborn blood spot test (Parsons
et al. 2002). This provides both the potential benefits:
avoiding the distressing diagnostic Odyssey and enabling in-
formed reproductive decisions. Will this also be true for other
untreatable genetic disorders?
The question of whether to require specific and distinct
consent for disorders like DMD or SMA (Swoboda 2010),
for which treatments are still experimental and not yet routine-
ly available, is important (Ross 2006; Ross and Clarke 2017).
It would require a two-tier consent process for newborn
screening, with the traditional screen being heavily recom-
mended for the direct benefit of the infant and the second-
level, opt-in, tests being for broader benefits to the family. It
may be helpful to ‘tweak’ the information-and-consent pro-
cess to emphasise the distinction between the two types of test
(Parsons et al. 2000), thereby improving the quality of the
consent and the satisfaction of patients and professionals. It
may further be argued that a different set of criteria should be
developed to help think through which disorders could legit-
imately be included in extended newborn screening (Petros
2012).
A further concern about the extended panel approach to
newborn screening is that it identifies as patients many who
are far from developing symptoms, some of whom will never
become unwell (e.g. half of those with medium chain acyl
coA dehydrogenase deficiency, MCADD). This leads to a
new category of the ‘patient-in-waiting’ (Timmermans and
Buchbinder 2010). There may be additional categories of pa-
tients where even early treatment for the affected child will not
lead to a ‘cure’ but to a long and difficult illness; a family’s
choices in future pregnancies may need to be based on a real-
istic assessment of treatment outcomes, which may not be
available until long-term research programmes have reported
their results. It should also be acknowledged that the natural
history of some of these biochemical disorders has actually
been clarified by newborn screening, which is an unbiased
method of case ascertainment. The decision to include some
disorders in screening may not always have met the Wilson
and Jungner criterion of an ‘adequate’ knowledge of the nat-
ural history (Timmermans and Buchbinder 2012) but has led
to an improved understanding of the penetrance of the
condition.
Newborn screening may lead to the identification of other
patients in the family, in addition to the diagnosed infant,
perhaps an older sibling or a parent. A health care system that
identifies such cases but fails to support the families in meet-
ing the needs of these additional patients is clearly failing to
discharge its responsibilities (Buchbinder and Timmermans
2011).
Another category of newborn screening which has been
introduced, often for a genetic condition, is screening for im-
paired hearing. This gives access to cochlear implantation for
those with severe deafness. In those for whom cochlear im-
plants do not permit highly effective communication, the use
of sign language may have been preferable. The decision to
use sign language rather than cochlear implants may also be
preferable to the community of The Deaf, which is formed
around and through sign language. How will this community
fare if so many potential recruits are now treated with implant
surgery? How can we be confident that we have chosen the
best treatment to be selected for each child?
Finally, in this section, we turn to consider WGS as a rou-
tine for newborn infants. Some useful diagnoses would
emerge earlier than when waiting for a symptomatic presen-
tation, although that is not always an advantage if it generates
distress but there are no effective interventions to alter the
natural history of the condition. This would enormously am-
plify the ‘patient-in-waiting’ category, i.e. the ‘worried well’
of asymptomatic individuals who have been found to carry
sometimes pathogenic genetic variants in genes associated
with late onset or incomplete penetrance. This would apply,
for example, to those carrying a variant in a gene known to
make a contribution to the risk of a cardiac dysrhythmia or
cardiomyopathy. VUSs may also be found in such genes. The
difficulties of VUS interpretation would loom large and the
handling of information about adult-onset disorders and carri-
er status of largely reproductive significance. The disadvan-
tages of WGS performed on newborn infants as a routine
screen (i.e. unless used to achieve a diagnosis for a severe
and complex condition) are serious (Howard et al. 2015).
It must not be forgotten that newborn screening by WGS
could never replace the more traditional metabolic screen,
both because the prognostic value of the metabolic screen
has great power and because the commonest disorder identi-
fied, congenital hypothyroidism, often has no specific genetic
cause (it most often arises from a failure of thyroid gland
development and migration). Furthermore, this model of new-
born WGS, both as a form of newborn screening and as a
lifetime resource, depends on long-term data storage as al-
ready discussed, with the attendant difficulties and costs
(Clarke 2014).
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In the present state of our ability to interpret genome se-
quence data, the generation of WGS on newborns as a routine
- rather than its infrequent use in attempting to achieve the
diagnosis of rare and complex disorders, which would be its
‘obvious’ (clinically warranted) application—appears to be a
wolf in sheep’s clothing: a massive research programme in the
guise of a population screening programme. However, while it
would be too vast to secure research funding, it could not
possibly warrant funding as a population screening pro-
gramme because it lacks any evidence of clinical utility and
the opportunity costs would be immense. Given the extent of
the unmet health needs of the population of the wealthiest
country on the planet—the country from which the proposal
for newborn screening byWGS emanate—we cannot imagine
such a programme being justifiable in the foreseeable future,
even if it were entirely benign in its consequences.
A recent proposal to go beyond neonatal to routine, unre-
stricted prenatal WGS by non-invasive prenatal testing
(NIPWGS) appears to be a still less reasonable proposition,
given that it addresses no specific clinical goal. The propo-
nents appear oblivious to the confusion, anxiety and distress
that would inevitably accompany its implementation (Chen
and Wasserman 2017). While it is suggested that there would
be an intensive programme of parental education about
genome-based testing and an opportunity for moral reflection,
there seems to be little awareness of the challenges this would
entail at multiple levels. Furthermore, it is difficult to see what
is driving the programme, or what it is hoping to achieve, apart
from an increase in genome corporation profits at the expense
of much potential family misery.
This proposal was accompanied in the same journal issue
by a set of commentaries, some of which elaborated on the
problems likely to be caused if this rash proposal were imple-
mented, while others were supportive. The argument of Chen
and Wasserman that they are not drawing arbitrary, ‘eugenic’
lines between foetuses, but instead empowering parents to
make their own decisions, seems wilfully to ignore that this
reproductive empowerment is taking the shape of consumerist
eugenics, open to manipulation by Big Data Corporations,
health insurers and fashion, and fits neatly into the account
of contemporary ‘backdoor’ eugenics by Duster (2003).
Kaposy (2017) reminds us that the offer of choice in a
pregnancy will not always be experienced as liberating but
can be burdensome and disturbing, and that there is no call
or demand for prenatal NIPWGS in apparently healthy
pregnacies. (While it may be very possible for marketing
agencies to create a demand, this would most likely be
achieved by a re-framing of NIPWGS as the virtuous expres-
sion of parental responsibility and/or an enviable privilege of
wealth). Furthermore, Kaposy (correctly) sees values as con-
structed and context-responsive rather than monolithic and
fixed, so that the parents’ values may be moulded by the
process of seeking information through foetal WGS. We
might add that the process is likely both to reflect and to
reinforce an inappropriately strong form of genetic
determinism.
Ravitsky et al. (2017) reject the claim that NIPWGS would
increase parental autonomy. They point out that the prior risk
of disease in a healthy foetus is low and this impacts on the
interpretation of the findings. In addition, the quantity of data
that could be imparted is massive and the demands on mem-
bers of the public to make sense of this are utterly unrealistic.
The apparent belief of Chen and Wasserman that efficient
information transfer and a limited period of reflection will
allow couples to march happily on with their lives suggests
that we encounter very different people in our clinics from
those theymeet.We do not recognise in their fantasy the world
that we inhabit. As Mazersky and Sankar (2017) explain, the
making of decisions is in reality far removed from the ratio-
nalistic account of Chen and Wasserman. The direction of
inference from genotype to phenotype is an entirely different
sport from explanation of phenotype in terms of genotype, as
indicated by Botkin et al. (2017), Chen and Wasserman seem
grossly to exaggerate the capacity of the former. Botkin et al.
also make the point that the troubling aspects of the selective
termination of pregnancies on the basis of prenatal diagnosis
are not removed but exacerbated by extending the range of
‘abnormalities’ considered to be acceptable grounds for the
termination of an otherwise wanted pregnancy, especially
when the genotype=>phenotype link may be insecure. We
are not writing from an anti-abortion position fixed in princi-
ple but from a recognition of the human pain and suffering
involved in the termination of wanted (and perhaps perfectly
healthy) pregnancies.
Munthe (2017) makes the additional point that Chen and
Wasserman ignore the distinction between the technology per-
haps having some acceptable applications, while at the same
time being completely unacceptable as a population screening
programme.
Some of the supporters of NIPWGS focus attention away
from the foetal decisions being made to the management of
information about the future child (if s/he survives to term).
There are two particular problems with this. First, the fact that
NIPWGS would of necessity be offered during pregnancy
means that it cannot be aimed primarily at post-natal interven-
tions for the benefit of the child, as WGS would be simpler
and cheaper in the neonatal period or later in childhood. The
proposal of Chen & Wasserman must therefore be intended
primarily to lead to decisions about terminating apparently
healthy pregnancies; otherwise, why not wait? The other pos-
sible explanation - aiming at treatments applicable in utero—
is still premature even for most of the malformations that may
be amenable to maternal-foetal surgery; treatments in utero for
genetic disorders are still more remote. Secondly, the argu-
ment that it should be up to parents to decide whether to
generate ‘diff icult’ predict ive information about
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neurodegenerative disease in their children (Rhodes 2017)
ignores the fact that most adults at high risk of such conditions
choose not to find out, and that this is for very good reasons
given the realities of human psychology and family relation-
ships. (They may not be pure, autonomous Kantians but can
still be good people!)
Ethical issues in our multi-cultural UK society
How does one address ‘culture’ or ‘cultural difference’ in
genetic counselling? Like Odysseus, one has to steer one’s
craft between two waiting perils, the Scylla of cultural stereo-
types and false homogenisation on the one side and the
Charybdis of vain attempts to be blind to cultural difference
on the other. Avoiding both errors is important and requires
insight. This is a matter for training in counselling skills, per-
sonal development and supervision rather than chapters on
ethics; we do not have space to treat these aspects further here.
But some topics can—must—be broached.
One of the settings that most often raises ‘culture’ as an
issue in the context of genetic counselling in Britain is con-
sanguinity. What does the professional need to be aware of
when addressing this? First, that the topic is, or may be, highly
charged. Within the UK, many of those from communities in
which consanguineous marriage is customary and often pre-
ferred will have been treated badly by health professionals,
and perhaps others, when this topic has been raised in the past.
If they have a child with autosomal recessive disease, they
may have been blamed for this, perhaps quite explicitly, and
may even have been insulted.More likely, however, the blame
will have been implied, in the tone of voice perhaps. Such
behaviour by professionals is unacceptable and unprofession-
al. While it may occur less frequently than in the past, we
believe that it still happens all too often.
In the UK, at least, the sense of blame may have been
compounded by statements from Members of Parliament
and public health officials, who sometimes talk about consan-
guinity as a major social problem, especially among Muslims
drawn from South Asian populations, and suggest that this
community should change its long-standing practices. (They
tend not to mention other communities that favour this prac-
tice). The consanguineous familymay have felt that their com-
munity was under assault for this mark of difference, as well
as for other religious and political factors. It should not be
forgotten that the anti-consanguinity message of the health
professionals can find a target elsewhere too. There are other
consanguineous marriages in the UK, both within other ethnic
minorities and also within the white British majority. Such
statements can impact on their people’s (often already strong)
sense of shame and guilt for any genetic problem in their family.
From the perspective of the community practising consan-
guineous marriage, it will usually be seen as entirely natural
and a force for stability in the family, which enhances the
status of women and which is not usually associated with
genetic disorders in the community’s children. Professionals
must not forget the positive features of consanguinity and
should not use genetics as a route through which to voice
cultural prejudice. Furthermore, it is unhelpful, unfeeling
and unprofessional to blame parents for having children with
a serious inherited condition. The incidence of recessive dis-
orders is increased in consanguineous families and communi-
ties, and needs to be raised in a respectful manner in any
discussion about reproductive risks, but the global context
within which such marriages constitute a widespread social
tradition must not be forgotten (Modell and Darr 2002;
Hamamy et al. 2011; Bittles 2013).
Moving to consider lay and folk beliefs about the causes of
malformation and other birth defects, a wide-ranging review of
such beliefs by Kenen (1980) is enlightening. It shows the
recurrent patterns in such beliefs from around the world and
reminds us that these have been common in Europe until quite
recently; superstition may still play a role in the thinking of
people frommany parts of the world. The Urdu-speaking com-
munity from South Asia resident in UK has a wide range of
beliefs about birth defects and other paediatric conditions that
fit into Kenen’s scheme, and a range of attitudes to the use of
genetic investigations and, in pregnancies, to the use of ante-
natal screening that might lead to the offer of a termination of
pregnancy (Shaw and Hurst 2008; Bryant et al. 2011; Shaw
2012). It is most important to remember that ‘religion’, whether
Christianity, Islam or any other, is not monolithic and homoge-
neous but diverse and often negotiable. Professionals must
make no assumptions about how a patient thinks or how they
will respond in a given circumstance simply because they come
from a specific community or religious group. Many of the
attitudes and practices inminority ethnic groups are shared with
those from the majority white British ethnic group.
Particular solutions have sometimes been devised to meet
the needs of specific communities, whom one might expect to
be reluctant to use some aspects of genetic technology. Some
Orthodox Jewish communities use an anonymous programme
of carrier screening with the results disclosed to the match-
maker (not to the couple) indicating that a particular couple
would not make a good match (i.e. both are carriers of the
same autosomal recessive disorder) (Raz and Vizner 2008).
This approach may lead western clinicians to feel horror at the
loss of autonomy this entails but, in the context, it may at least
allow such communities to begin to engage with this aspect of
modern health care. However, it is important for the ‘western’
genetic counsellor (i.e. from a western family and community
background) to appreciate that many from ethnic minority
groups will have their own views that are shaped by their
experience of disease in the family and community as much
as by the beliefs and values of their religion (Atkin et al.
2008). Make no assumptions!
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When consanguinity is preferred within a community, it is
possible to maintain this custom but reduce the risks of serious
genetic disorders. One effective approach is to marry more
distant cousins. Another approach is to make carrier screening
available, either before marriage or in the antenatal clinic. A
number of countries in North Africa and the Persian//Arab
Gulf are using next generation sequencing to define the reces-
sive gene mutations present in their populations, often unique
to small population isolates or endogamous groups within a
country. Schemes differ in whether each individual tested is
given their own results and whether the results influence de-
cisions about marriage or decisions about pregnancy, prenatal
diagnosis and children. They also differ in whether they are
mandatory or optional, and the extent of the pressure to com-
ply with screening.
Several countries have developed a range of compulsory
interventions with the stated goal of reducing the birth inci-
dence of genetic disorders. One approach has been to carry out
tests for carrier state of genetic disorders, sometimes of spe-
cific disorders such as beta-thalassaemia, either before mar-
riage or conception or in the antenatal clinic. A different ap-
proach in China entails a (fairly) set and structured approach
to assessment of a married couple. The relevant law has
changed recently but before that the potential parents were
judged on criteria familiar from Nazi Eugenics, with an inter-
view and examination aimed to support the doctor making
decisions about the desirability of two persons having children
together (Hesketh 2003).
Infertility and childlessness are problematic within all so-
cieties, and the form taken by this problem will of course be
shaped by the culture and its expectations. In the lives of
South Asians who have settled in UK, there may be a tug
between the influence of tradition and the influence of the
individuals’ new experiences and acculturation into local life
(Hampshire et al. 2012). Secrecy around infertility and its
investigation and treatment is common in many communities.
Infertility seems to be particularly wounding to the male ego,
perhaps from some conflation of infertility and impotence.
Adoption can also be a very difficult idea to accept within
some communities, so that neither the admission of infertility
nor adoption as a constructive ‘remedy’may be recognised as
an available option for the infertile couple (Bharadwaj 2003, a
study set in India). This of course increases the pressure on
couples to use infertility services—but in secret.
Another potential conflict of perspectives arises in relation
to the preference for sons that is stronger within some com-
munities than others (although it was very powerful in UK
until not so long ago). The sex ratio at birth is heavily distorted
in some Indian states and in parts of China, with the sex ratio
at birth being around 900 females per 1000 male births across
India and below 800 females per 1000 males in some states
(Madan and Breuning 2014). A comparable distortion of the
sex ratio is also found within China and can be seen in some
western countries with communities of South Asian origin
when there is no legislation to restrict foetal sex selection.
The long-term social consequences of such ‘unbalanced’ sex
ratios are unpredictable and may change over time but will
surely generate major social problems. This imbalance of the
sexes results in both India and China from the widespread
(although illegal) use of medical technology to determine foe-
tal sex and terminate the female foetuses, and is reinforced in
India by the (also illegal) system of dowry payments. The
same would doubtless have happened in UK in previous cen-
turies if the technology had been available (i.e. if witchcraft,
magic or prayer had been more effective). In UK, where foetal
sex selection is not permitted, professionals can become con-
cernedwhen the talk or behaviour of patients in clinic suggests
that the family may be motivated to choose a ‘social’ termi-
nation of pregnancy after foetal sexing performed as part of
prenatal diagnosis for other reasons. Foetal sex selection has
been shown to occur in some South Asian groups resident in
Canada (Urquia et al. 2016).
Our western and feminist response to this scenario is horror
at the systematic devaluation of women that this implies.
Where women from communities that practice foetal sex se-
lection support this approach, this adds to the horror as it
supports the sense that life is hard for the women in these
communities. A contrasting feminist response has also been
proposed, reflecting a position of support for women’s deci-
sions even when a rejection of sex selection and strong sup-
port for women’s position in society would seem more con-
structive (Moazam (2004). The sense that women’s social
status needs support in some of these societies is reinforced
by a sad tale of stigmatisation within UK of a woman of
Bangladeshi origin who was affected by neurofibromatosis
type 1 (Rozario 2007). There are also unsettling parallels be-
tween foetal sex selection and the low social status of women
in some communities, on the one hand, and antenatal screen-
ing ‘for’ Down syndrome and the social status of affected
individuals in many western countries on the other
(Alderson 2001).
Decisions about what disorders are sufficiently serious to
warrant a termination of pregnancy have a cross-cultural di-
mension. However, it would clearly be difficult to disentangle
the many factors that may contribute to this. Thus the stage of
economic development within a society, confidence in support
from the family, community or state, intrinsic beliefs about
what makes life worthwhile and the moral status of the em-
bryo are all important but unquantifiable and often negotiable
factors. One example is the striking diversity of views about
termination of pregnancy for deafness, with the lack of confi-
dence of support from the community in raising a child with
deafness given as one factor that may contribute to a decision
to terminate in some countries (Nahar et al. 2013). For a child
born into a Deaf family, of course, rearing a Deaf child may be
the preferred option and sign language will often be chosen
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over cochlear implantation. Personal experiences and the de-
gree of acculturation are likely also to be relevant factors.
Conclusion
We present this whistle-stop tour through ‘the ethics of genet-
ics in medicine’ as an educational resource. It has evolved
since the turn of the century and will doubtless continue to
change and develop as the issues that arise in our clinical
practice also change. We have only been able to cover some
aspects of this broad topic but we hope that the general ap-
proach adopted here proves useful and that it can be adapted to
the particular circumstances in which you are working.
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